The Vietnam Nationalist Party and the National Liberation of Vietnam

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Abstract

In the current literature on the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc dân đảng), besides the literary works and memoirs, a number of articles and monographs have dealt with the establishment, organizational structure, operational sites and provided some preliminary assessments of this political party. However, there are still some issues that need further research. By studying documents about the guiding principles, action plans and statute of the party, referencing and making comparisons with the notes and reports of the Indochinese General Security Department, and summerizing and analyzing the historical information provided by domestic and foreign works on revolutionary leader Nguyễn Thái Học and the Nationalist Party, the article seeks to clarify the two following issues: the Vietnam Nationalist Party’s political views on the ‘national liberation’ question, and the role of the Vietnam Nationalist Party in Vietnam’s nationalist movement prior to the rise of the Communist Party.

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Introduction The Vietnam Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc dân đảng,VNP) was a political organization founded in late 1927, based on the Nam Dong Publishing House (Nam Đồng thư xã), and associated with Nguyen Thai Học, Nguyen Khac Nhu, Pho Đuc Chinh, and Hoang Pham Tran (Nhuong Tong). Although most of the leaders were intellectuals, civil servants and Confucianists, the VNP represents the bourgeois political ideology and national revolutionary tendencies in Vietnam. Up to now, regarding the studies of the Vietnam Nationalist Party (VNP), apart from the works of its important members such as Hoang Van Dao, the author of The Vietnam Nationalist Party, Modern History of the Struggle 1927-1954 [1970] and Nhuong Tong, the author of Nguyen Thai Hoc (1902-1930) [2014], there are some references and university books dealing with the VNP as one of the three most prominent political parties in Vietnam in 1920s. The notable ones are the books by Tran Huy Lieu, a historian and important member of the party, including History of the 80 Years Resistance to the French [1957] and Reference on Vietnam’s Modern Revolutionary History, Vol. 5 [1956]. Also, there are such works as: Tran Van Giau, Dinh Xuan Lam, Kieu Xuan Ba Modern History of Vietnam Vol. 4 [1963]; Ho Song History of Vietnam 1919-1929, Vol. 3 [1979]; Nguyen Khanh Toan (ed.) History of Vietnam 1858-1945, Vol. 2 [2004]. Recently there have appeared some monographs such as History of Vietnam, Vol. 3 [2012] by Dinh Xuan Lam (ed.); History of Vietnam from 1919 to 1930, Vol. 8 by Ta thi Thuy (ed.) [2013]. Outside Vietnam, the VNP has also been discussed in some monographs and books on Vietnam in the period before and after 1930 such as P. Brocheux and D. Hémery Indochine la colonization ambigue (1858-1954) [1995]; F. Guillemont Đại Việt indépendence et révolution au Vietnam [2012]; J. Buttinger Vietnam, a Dragon Embattled, Vol. 1 From Colonization to the Viet Minh [1967]; D. Marr Vietnamese Tradition on Trial 1920-1945 [1981]; J. Duiker The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1940 [1976], etc. In the former Soviet Union and current Russia, there have also appeared a number of research works on the Vietnamese national liberation trends in the 1920s, including issues such as the bourgeois revolutionary tendency and the Vietnam Nationalist Party as its representative organization. Some typical studies can be mentioned: A.P. Shiltova, V.Ph. Mordvinov National Liberation Movement in Vietnam (1858-1945) [1958]; М.А. Cheshkov The Role of Democratic-Bourgeois Tendencies in the Vietnam Nationalist Liberation Movement [1968]; O.V. Novakova Colonial Policy of France and the National Liberation Movement in Vietnam 1917-1929 [1967] and O.V. Novakova, P.Yu. Tsvetov History of Vietnam, part 2 [1995]. At the same time, besides the key issues, such as the membership, leadership, organizational structure and operations, one important issue relating to the VNP still need to be discussed, namely, the role of the VNP in Vietnam’s revolutionary movements. This article analyzes the views of the VNP on the rise of nationalism, the similarities and differences between the VNP and the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat Sen, the operation spaces, and the VNP’s role in the national liberation movements prior to the establishment of the Communist Party of Vietnam in early 1930. The VNP’s views on the nationalist issue The VNP is a political party representing the Vietnamese bourgeoisie. It was officially founded on December 25, 1927 in Hanoi. Influenced by Sun Yat Sen and his Three People’s Principles, the national liberation movement developed rapidly in Vietnam in the 1920s. The impact of these Principles on Vietnamese patriots was so strong that “the Chinese nationalism was transformed into the Vietnamese nationalism by adding Vietnamese elements” [Trần Huy Liệu et al. 1956: 15]. Such a development had a strong impact on political ideas, organizational structure and operational sites of the VNP. When it was introduced, the VNP proposed “to accomplish the nationalist revolution before participating in the world revolution”. Following this strategy, the party “would join the underprivileged nations to conduct the world revolution” after having accomplished the national revolution [Trần Huy Liệu et al. 1956: 18]. In 1929, the program was amended, and the VNP declared that its goal was to “make the national revolution” [Trần Huy Liệu et al. 1956: 98] in order to establish a republic regime. This goal was expressed more clearly in the Party’s Action Plan. Having asserted its guiding principles as consisted of the three core values, Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, the VNP declared again that it sought to make a national revolution, a political revolution and a social revolution. Compared to the Three People’s Principles of Sun Yat Sen, the VNP’s political guidelines and ideology are somewhat similar as they “focus on the national aspect instead of the class aspect”. But, in its action plans and program since its introduction on December 15, 1927, “the Three People’s Principles were not officially acknowledged as the party’s ideology”, because “their contents were mostly Chinese” [Trần Huy Liệu et al. 1956: 38]. However, the VNP’s views and those of Sun Yat Sen differ significantly in the nationalist perspective. Sun Yat Sen proposed to conduct revolution through the three stages: Military, Political and Constitutional. He set out three objectives, relative to nationalism. The first was to conduct mass communication campaigns to awaken and lead the people to struggle against the Qing dynasty. The second was to test some methods of armed struggle. The third was to conduct a mass revolution to overthrow the Qing dynasty. Meanwhile, the VNP intended to mobilize the entire population, conduct the national revolution, develop the republic democratic regime and assist oppressed nations to conduct their own revolutions to liberate themselves. Essentially, the VNP’s nationalist ideas differed from those visualized by Sun Yat Sen. In China, before the Xinhua Revolution (1911), influenced by the Western nationalistic ideas and due to the overt intervention of the imperialist forces into China, Sun Yat Sen adjusted his strategy as a matter of “creating a republic of five ethnic groups”, where the most important role belonged to the Han-Chinese. This strategy might have been the second stage in the development of Sun Yat Sen’s nationalism. However, in the beginning, Sun Yat Sen’s nationalism was principally the Great Han nationalism. Once he said: “The Han must control the government before governing the country; when the government is controlled by other ethnic groups, the country is in their hands… Now that the government belongs to the Manchu, we, the Han people, continue to pursue our aspiration… to continue our uprising” [Sun Yat Sen 1995: 189]. In another text, he affirmed that “according to the social customs in the history of China… nationalism was that of Chinese” (i.e., the Han nationalism). He emphasized that “Nationalism means the Chinese nationalism, only being applied to China but not to a foreign country” [Sun Yat Sen 1995: 50-51]. After the May Fourth Movement (May 4, 1919), especially after the China Nationalist Party began to cooperate with the China Communist Party in 1923, Sun Yat Sen’s worldview on nationalism changed and was even amended to become the Great four strategies: to ally with Russia, to cooperate with Communists, to support workers and farmers, and to ensure equal land rights, as well as to restrain capitalism. He advocated “the harmonization of ethnic groups”, overthrowing the emperor to restore independence, introducing “self-determination among the ethnicities” and constructing a nation of a “Great China” [Nguyễn Văn Hồng et al. 2013: 90]. Sun Yat Sen’s nationalism was a process of ongoing transformation, initially aimed at “ostracizing the Manchu”, “establishing a republic of five ethnic groups” and finally building the “Great China”. It was essentially the “Great Han” nationalism. On the other hand, the VNP’s nationalist ideology focused on opposing the oppression of nations by foreign aggressors and ultimately aimed to overthrow the colonial and feudal rule to regain national independence and liberty. This ideology was not only demonstrated in the VNP’s guiding motto, but also in its views of the forces needed to conduct the national revolution. Since its establishment, the VNP asserted its intention as “to make contact with all compatriots and comrades, regardless of class and faith, and to use violence to regain independence for Vietnam” [Nhượng Tống 2014: 26]. It was a progressive idea in comparison to that of patriotic Confucian intellectuals of the early 20th century, such as Phan Boi Chau with his idea of national strength, especially of the role of workers and farmers in the struggle for the national liberation. However, this progressive idea was only reflected in the VNP’s guiding principles and overall strategy, while in reality the Party mainly focused on developing its membership and operational bodies among the petty bourgeoisie, (i.e., small owners, teachers, government officers, etc.), rich landlords and especially Vietnamese soldiers in the French army. As far as workers and farmers are concerned, the VNP only recruited them into the unions (popular organizations), where they functioned as party’s sympathizers. Trần Dân Tiên also made a general remark that “the Vietnam Nationalist Party seemed to be unaware of the force of the masses. Its publicity campaigns and organizational structure were mostly associated with the middle-class” [Trần Dân Tiên 2004: 73]. During the two years of its existence, the VNP only invested its efforts and budget in producing bombs and forging weapons in the provinces and only conducted acts of terrorism and assassinations. The most well-known of them was the assassination of Bazin at his house (No. 110, Huế street, Hanoi), in February, 1929 . Obviously, Sun Yat Sen wished to promote a version of the Chinese nationalism, the Great Han nationalism in its essence. Meanwhile, the VNP only intended put an end to the oppression of the Vietnamese nation and to solve the nationalist issue through the revolutionary goal to overthrow the French colonial domination by mobilizing forces of the entire nation. That was the main difference between Sun Yat Sen’s Three People’s Principles and the VNP’s strategy concerning the issue of nationalism. The contribution of the VNP to the national liberation of Vietnam Having made its utmost to muster popular forces, to create and develop the organizational structure, to gather and connect domestic and overseas patriotic forces, the VNP came to the final decision to engage with French colonial rulers in the Yên Bái uprising to “make a merit despite the possibility of failure”, sacrificing itself to make an example “for the successors to follow” [Hoàng Văn Đào 1970: 104]. To prepare for the uprising, under the General Committee’s leadereship, the VNP’s organs actively prepared weapons and produced grenades and ammunition [Direction des Affaires Politiques 1933: 10]. When the plan had been discussed and some changes made, the uprising was launched in Yên Bái on the night of February 9, 1930 and spread across many provinces in Tonkin. It was considered to be the ultimate effort by the leaders as well as by all the VNP’s members. However, a week later, the French authorities used brute forces to suppress the groups of rebellions. The uprising ended in utter failure. The failure of the Yên Bái uprising was due to many causes, both subjective and objective ones. But the creation of the VNP, its operations, and especially courage of its leaders and loyal soldiers in the uprising had an important role in the development of the national liberation movement in Vietnam prior to 1930. The VNP existed and acted over two years, but it contributed the spirit of patriotism and self-determination to the Vietnamese masses during the uprising. Driven by patriotism, leaders of the party Nguyen Thai Hoc, Nguyen Khac Nhu, Pho Đuc Chinh and Nguyen The Nghiep voluntarily left their prestigious professional positions and abandoned their study, fame and status to resolutely embark in the revolutionary path and readily sacrificed themselves for the greater cause: to fight and overthrow the French colonial domination in order to regain national independence and liberty. Regularly publishing progressive newspapers and books, the Nam Đong Publishing House launched the newspaper Hồn cách mạng (The Soul of Revolution) and other publicity campaigns, the VNP contributed to direct patriotic education, urging on and sustaining the persistent and unyielding will in the Vietnamese people to fight against foreign invaders and to put an end to the French colonialists’ domination. Particularly, the VNP’s party members’ bravery and courage in their anti-French operations, especially in the Yên Bái uprising, was a bright example of revolutionary heroism, the spirit of courage and the willingness to self-sacrifice for the Fatherland. After the uprising, hundreds of its participants and thousands of their compatriots were arrested, imprisoned and executed by the French colonial authorities. Four months later, on June 17, 1930, 13 soldiers of the VNP and its leader Nguyễn Thái Học were beheaded in Yên Bái by the French authorities [Treize Têtes: 17.06.1930; Roubaud 1931: 159-160]. Also, between July 1929 and January 1931, the VNP’s 37 members were beheaded in Tonkin; about one thousand patriots were incarcerated in prisons, the Poulo-Condor prison among them. In late 1930, the French transferred some prisoners to Vanuatu. In 1931, they transferred the VNP’s 300 members from Poulo-Condor to the French-occupied Guyane Islands in South America to isolate these political prisoners and to exploit them as workforce in the island [Hoàng Văn Đào 1970: 177]. Despite being crushed brutally, the Yên Bái directly hit feudal and colonial rulers, crippling their authorities in many places. From February 9 to 15, 1930, the barracks and some French governing organs in Yên Bái fell into hands of the insurgent forces in local areas, such as Hưng Hóa, Phú Thọ, Sơn Tây, Hải Dương, Thái Bình. The administrative offices in many districts and prefectures were attacked and even captured for a while by the insurgent forces. It has been argued that, from World War I to early 1930, the Yên Bái uprising was the strongest and most notable revolutionary event in the Vietnamese national liberation movement, in the fight against the French colonial rule. As Hồng Thế Công aka Hà Huy Tập put it in 1933, “the uprising was an event of indubitable revolutionary significance…It was a large-scale revolt of Indochinese workers against French imperialists” [Hồng Thế Công 1933: 667]. It was the inevitable result of the tyrannical rule imposed by the French colonial rulers upon the Vietnamese people, of the intense contradiction between the entire Vietnamese population and the dominating feudal and colonial forces. The uprising failed in achieving its objective, yet it had crippled the system of feudal and colonial rulers and brought them into a state of extreme panic. The popularity and impact of the uprising not only hit the French authorities in Indochina, but also spread to France. Many French newspapers published articles about the heroic struggle of the VNP’s soldiers and their self-sacrifice for independence and liberty. After the uprising, the French Communist Party, the Communist International and the International Anti-Imperialist Front called French working people to support the VNP. The Vietnamese abroad and French Communists held many demonstrations of protest against the brutal oppression by the French colonial authorities of the VNP’s soldiers and Vietnamese patriots. To a certain extent, the VNP achieved the “minimum” objective of causing an “earthquake” that rocked the entire French colonial domination in Indochina. Despite its failure, the uprising remained a valuable lesson for the Vietnamese revolution in terms of how to create and develop a political organization of ample strategic and fighting prowess, and how to organize and lead the entire nation to final victory in the life-and-death fight with the enemy. The most important factor is how to determine the right political strategy and proper organizational and operational methods. Compared to the patriotic Confucian scholars of the early 20th century, the VNP did show progressive ideas and did its best to mobilize the masses, especially workers, to struggle for the national liberation. However, the party had no genuine political program and in particular no feasible strategy to attract and recruit workers and farmers who would be the main force in the revolution. While pioneering the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial movement, the VNP did not intend to uproot the feudal system so as to give lands to peasants. Therefore, the party was not able to get support among the population, in particular, workers and farmers, in its goal to liberate the nation. That is why the Yên Bái uprising did not get any support and participation of the entire population; that is why its failure was inevitable. Apart from the lesson of organizing political party and devising the strategy for uniting and preparing national forces, the Yên Bái uprising conducted many experiences in preparing armed forces, especially in taking the opportunity to generate the conditions and forces for the revolution, as well as in fighting, capturing and controlling governing authorities. Despite their errors and shortcomings, the VNP and the uprising represent the climax of nationalist bourgeois movements in Vietnam since the end of World War I to the 1930s. However, at that time and even in following decades, the VNP and the bourgeois revolutionary intentions were not adequately and objectively assessed. It was argued that the VNP consisted mostly of petty bourgeoisie and represented their ideas and rights. The 6th Congress of the Communist International (August 1928) stated that the bourgeoisie in the colonies tended to compromise with imperialists, being against the movement of workers and peasants, against the land revolution. As for the petty bourgeoisie, at the early stages of the national movement, they might be active but in later stages this group might become reactionary. The report of the 6th Congress of the Comintern assessed that some social groups/classes could become enemies of the proletariat movement [Revolyucionnoe dvizhenie 1929: 519]. In the Letter to Indochina Communists in 1929 under the title Missions of the Indochinese Communists, the Communist International stated that the bourgeoisie were “generally weak-minded and associated with land ownership and landlords; on the other hand, they were influenced by the Chinese bourgeoisie and their anti-revolutionary standpoint. A part of the contemporary bourgeoisie cooperated with the French imperialists. Some sought to negotiate with them. For sure, the entire bourgeoisie was not able to overcome revisionist nationalism and as the agrarian revolution progressed, they would eventually join the anti-revolutionary camp”. Some bourgeois groups attempted to take the lead in the national liberation movement, but they did so in order to foil the movement and betray the revolution”. As for the petty bourgeoisie, which comprised most of the leadership of the VNP, the Communist International considered them to be the most resolute representatives of not only the petty bourgeoisie’s interests, but also of the general and objective interests of the entire national bourgeoisie. The Communist International asserted that “all the urban petty bourgeoisie could be a dynamic of democratic bourgeois revolution”, while “the employed craftsmen, street vendors and unemployed petty intellectuals were the most revolutionary forces among the urban petty bourgeoisie” [Revolyucionnoe dvizhenie 1929]. Influenced by this ideology, after the 6th Congress (the 1920s) to the late 1930s, Communist parties, the Vietnam Communist Party among them, always prioritized the class and the class struggle as the “basic” elements in generalizing and orientating their political strategies in the national liberation movement in colonies [Đỗ Quang Hưng 1999: 30]. Assessing this question, the French scientist Marangé also acknowledged that the VI Congress of the Communist International decided to return to the line of «class struggle» and conduct «proletariation» of all communist parties [Marangé 2012: 77]. In this context, it is understandable that the VNP and the nationalist bourgeois inclination were said to have lacked the revolutionary spirit and even to have been outdated and reactionary. Later, that “leftist” view of the Communist International had been adjusted, but in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the class ideology and the class struggle were still dominant in the political agenda of the Communist International and the Communist Party of Indochina. Besides, when the Yên Bái uprising came to an end, the VNP’s organizational structure was basically disintegrated. Most its leaders were captured and murdered; most its members were caught or imprisoned; only a handful of individuals and party organs either remained inactive or moved to China to await new opportunities. Later these groups recruited more members and gradually revealed their anti-revolutionary tendency, and even attempted to link with some domestic and foreign reactionary forces to sabotage the Vietnamese revolutionary movement led by the Communist Party of Indochina. That is the cause of the fundamental difference in views between the VNP led by Nguyen Thai Hoc in the period before 1930 and the group/ organization of the VNP in the 1940s and after the August Revolution (1945). Historical experience showed that, under the tyrannical rule by the feudalists and colonialists, in Vietnam, most of the urban bourgeoisie, first and foremost petty bourgeoisie, showed their national pride and patriotism in their struggle against the French. Since the end of World War I, in face of the cowardice and feebleness of the bourgeoisie, the urban bourgeois classes were able to raise nationalist spirit by marshalling and leading the masses to fight against brutal colonial rulers with different methods and in different forms. In the boisterous development of post-war national movements, many revolutionary organizations of bourgeois intellectuals were founded, such as the Vietnam League for National Restoration, the High Aspiration Youth Party, and well-known Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League, the New Vietnam Revolutionary Party and the VNP. The emergence and existence of all these political parties created new nuances and stimulations for the Vietnamese national movement in the 1920s. Thus, although it only existed and operated for a short time, the VNP represented a progressive development in the post-war Vietnamese national movement. The VNP’s and the Yên Bái uprising’s failure was inevitable. But speaking objectively, that failure paved the way for the Vietnamese working class, represented by the Communist Party, to quickly rise and obtain exclusive leadership since 1930. Conclusion Originating in a half-feudal, half-colonized country, the Vietnamese bourgeoisie was weak economically and feeble politically. Their shortcomings made them neither reputed nor capable enough to gather the masses and lead the national liberation revolution. With an active and enthusiastic disposition towards revolution and driven by patriotism, the urban petty bourgeoisie raised the spirit of nationalism by gathering national forces in the struggle for national liberation. Although its membership was mostly patriotic petty bourgeoisie, the VNP represented the rights and ideas of the nationalist bourgeoisie. Prior to the Yên Bái uprising, the ideas and mottos of the VNP were primarily adopted from Sun Yat Sen’s Three People’s Principles. Yet, there were differences of ideals between the VNP and the Principles of Sun Yat Sen on the issue of national liberation. Sun Yat Sen considered the Chinese nationalism as the Greater Han nationalism, while the VNP prioritized the goal of liberating the Vietnamese people and mobilizing different popular forces to overthrow the domination of French colonialists and restore national independence. The failure of the Yên Bái uprising proved the incapacity and powerlessness of Vietnam’s national bourgeois movement. But through its emergence and operations, the VNP propagated progressive patriotic ideas in Vietnam, raising the awareness of patriotism and the spirit of national self-determination among common people. The VNP was one of the political groups that contributed greatly to mobilizing the people, organizing and leading the Vietnamese national movement [Văn Khánh Nguyễn 2016: 128]. The failure of the VNP and the Yên Bái uprising created an opportunity for the working class to rapidly gain advantage in the national movement and to gain absolute leadership in the national liberation cause. After the Yen Bay uprising of the VNP, the bourgeoisie officially left the political scene to render their position to the Communist Party to lead the national liberation [Tạ Thị Thúy 2007: 542]. Despite failure, the VNP and the Yên Bái uprising provided many valuable lessons for Vietnamese revolutionary endeavors in the latter periods, especially in determining the momentum of the revolution, the creation and consolidation of national solidarity in order to overthrow the colonial domination and regain independence and liberty for the country. Aware of patriotic and revolutionary nature of the VNP, right from its constitutional conference on February 3, 1930, the Communist Party of Vietnam advocated to attract the VNP’s members into the anti-imperialist Association [Đảng cộng sản Việt Nam 2002: 10] for the national liberation.
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About the authors

Van Khanh Nguyen

VNU

Email: khanhnv@vnu.edu.vn
Professor, Faculty of History, University of Social Sciences and Humanities, VNU, Hanoi. ORCID: 0000-0002-5510-9535. Hanoi

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