The Russian Version of the Vietnamese War

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Vasiliev A.M. Voyna vo Vietname: Pochemu amerikantsy poterpeli porazhenie [The War in Vietnam: Why the Americans Were Defeated] Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2021. 383 s. ISBN 978-5-227-07919-0 A.M. Vasiliev, the RAS Academician, President of The RAS Institute for African Studies, the editor-in-chief of “Asia and Africa Today” journal, has prepared and published the book “War in Vietnam: Why the Americans Were Defeated”. A.M.Vasiliev is known in the academic world as an outstanding native Orientalist, whose works are mainly concerned with Africa, particularly with North Africa, where the Arabic language prevails. The scholar graduated from the MGIMO University with the knowledge of the Arabic language. That is why his main researches are concerned with the sphere of Arab East. Of the recent researches his work on the Arab spring is noteworthy [Retsepty Arabskoy vesny 2012], as well as the one on history of Soviet “limited contingent” intrusion into Afghanistan, of his earlier works [Vasiliev 2014]. In Vietnam Alexey Vasiliev, at the age of 28, appeared by destinies, when “The Pravda” newspaper needed a correspondent in the Asian country at war. None but a young and sound man with the diploma of the Orientalist at that could be the best for the work. Thus, in 1968 the would-be academician became a special correspondent of the main Soviet newspaper who worked in Hanoi for two years. He worked productively, and in 1970, having used the materials of his mission he published the book “The Rockets over the Lotus Flower” [Vasiliev 1970], which is a rare book today. A significant part of the correspondent archive and his publications of those years have been put into his new book. Another large mass of the original information for the significant part of the book served memoirs of Soviet military advisers, having been sent to Vietnam during the American war. Also, they had been published in the collection “The War in Vietnam … How it was” (1965-1973)” [Voyna vo V’etname 2005]. This is a winning move. Of course, A.M. Vasiliev knew many military secrets of that time himself, but in those years, they could not be published. Thus, on the use of Soviet rocket men recollections the book demystifies the first missile launches against US planes, invading the DRV air space. At first, it was Soviet soldiers, that pressed the starting button, as there were no trained rocket men in Vietnam. Only, having been trained by Soviet comrades according to the known method “do what I do”, Vietnamese could operate surface-to-air missiles. Here is A.V. Vasiliev’s valuable present-day admission: “The first battles were fought by Soviet combat crews, and Vietnamese crews, participating in all the operations were understudy-trainees. Later, the operations preparing missile launch and guidance were carried out by Vietnamese, and Soviet rocket men stood by, operatively correcting possible mistakes” (p. 87). The third information source of the book is American publications. Though there is plenty of literature on the Vietnamese war in the US, the author uses a small part of it, mostly memoirs of the Americans who during the war in Vietnam began to see clearly, who understood the entire amorality and criminality of their participation in the events in the far Asian country. Later some of those “GI” became well-known politicians. Thus, the book contains the verbose speech of John Kerry, the would-be US State Secretary, in the Senate in April 1971, where, in particular, he stated the following: “In our opinion, and from our experience, there is nothing in South Vietnam, nothing which could happen that realistically threatens the United States of America. And to attempt to justify the loss of one American life in Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos by linking such loss to the preservation of freedom, which those misfits [Vietnamese Communists. - P.Ts.] supposedly abuse, is to use the height of criminal hypocrisy, and it is that kind of hypocrisy which we feel has torn this country apart” (p. 353). These three sources of factual material were to answer the question in the book title: “Why were Americans defeated?” As a witness of heroism and steadfastness of the Vietnamese people in their opposition to American aggressors, A.M. Vasiliev considers this factor to be the chief one in the victory of Vietnam. Besides, A.M. Vasiliev adds the bold (by today’s Russian standards) statement: “This was the victory of the Vietnamese Communist regime (i.e., ideology, Party structure, permeating the whole society, armed forces, security authorities, discipline, propaganda). At that time, it was the expression of national aspirations of most Vietnamese in North and in South, morally ready for victims and for the war lasting many years, to expel Americans and to unite the country” (p. 377). The second factor pointed out by the author is “the victory of Soviet arms”. Here, it is justly included the role of Soviet specialists who took part in the war on the Vietnamese side. A.M. Vasiliev is sure: “Without them Vietnam could not have won, and who knows how many years could the war have lasted” (с. 9). B.N. Chaplin, one of the best Soviet/Russian ambassadors in Vietnam (now late) once said in a private conversation, that the war in Vietnam had been won not by soldiers, but by politicians and diplomats. The role of both North Vietnamese and Soviet diplomacy is also showed in the book, though not in such a large scale as the rest factors. Nonetheless, A.M. Vasiliev laconically, but precisely represented all the upheavals of the negotiation process; at that, not only on the line of Washington - Hanoi, but also in the triangle of the USSR - the USA - the DRV. The author’s explanation of the complicated position of the Soviet authorities is not out of place: “Soviet leaders, supporting the struggle of the Vietnamese people, were to find the way to cooperation with the USA in order not to permit the world catastrophe, i.e., the nuclear war” (p. 360). The author believes that as a whole, “the Vietnamese epic of the USSR foreign policy was put to golden fund of its successes” (p. 380). The reviewer is of opinion that the author could have paid more attention to the inner-American factor of the war results. A.M. Vasiliev has mentioned “the mess among American bosses, military and civil, between the CIA and the Congress, inside the Democratic party itself and between the Democratic party and the Republicans (p. 340-341), but he has not given concrete examples of this “mess” to complete the picture. However, the interested reader can turn for this to Russian translations of the books by Phillip Davidson [Devidson 2002], Robert McNamara [Maknamara 2004], Barbara Tuchman [Tuchman 2015]. In the end, the defeat in the war in Vietnam was first and foremost the defeat of American politicians but not of soldiers. However, it would be illogical to assess the book by A.M. Vasiliev as the research-work. Despite many precise and objective formulas this work is fiction. Thus, in the book there is no references to the Russian and American editions having been used by the author. The author’s task has been different: he has seen his duty to write the book about those Soviet people who served in Vietnam. Another circumstance has urged him to publish a new book on the Vietnamese war: “now among our admirers of the US, there are many who try either to forget or to justify the US policy in Vietnam… While rejecting the entire Soviet legacy, they reject the USSR assistance to Vietnam” (p. 9). The academician is right: the glorious pages of our recent history are still actual. A.M. Vasiliev, “a soldier of the propaganda war”, as he has called himself, has indisputably fulfilled these tasks.

About the authors

P. Yu Tsvetov

Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) of Russia

Email: proviet99@mail.ru
PhD (History), Assosiate Professor

References

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