Japan - Vietnam Extensive Strategic Partnership: Interests and Constraints

Cover Page

Cite item


The article discusses the formation and deepening of the strategic partnership between Japan and Vietnam, the structural characteristics of relations in the spheres of politics and security, as well as the commonality of interests and the limits of rapprochement between the two countries. The comprehensive improvement of Japanese-Vietnamese relations is based on a combination of strategic and economic interests. The first part of the article is devoted to the key trends in the development of relations between Japan and Vietnam. The second part defines areas of convergence of interests and constraints on the path of further rapprochement between Tokyo and Hanoi. The author makes the assumption that the strategic cooperation between the two countries will continue to expand in the future due to the fact that it is based on a broad coincidence of mutual interests, both strategic and economic.

Full Text


Relations between Japan and Vietnam at the beginning of the 21st century show a trend towards comprehensive improvement and development in all fields. Although interaction began to grow in the 1990s, it was in the last two decades that significant progress was made in cooperation in both the political and security spheres and in the economy. Reflecting these trends, in 2006 Japan and Vietnam agreed to build a strategic partnership, and in 2014 raised the level of relations to a “extensive strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia”. During his term of office as Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe (2006–2007 and 2012–2020), who held this post for the longest time in the country’s history during his second term, managed to formulate a full-fledged foreign policy strategy and to carry out numerous measures aimed at its implementation. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in general and individual Southeast Asian states in particular have become countries, improving relations with which cabinet S. Abe has made one of its foreign policy priorities [Phan Xuan Dung 2020]. The Japanese Premier was able to achieve quite a lot in the direction of SEA, but among all the countries of the region it was with Vietnam that Japan managed to reach the most significant progress and to advance the relationship.

The intensification of ties between Japan and Vietnam raises questions about the political and security interests of both countries, the progress they have made and the constraints on further cooperation. The issue of the motivation of Tokyo and Hanoi carries great importance for understanding the modern nature of relations between the two countries and explaining the reasons for their rather rapid development since the mid-2000s. An analysis of the obstacles to further rapprochement is also important for assessing the prospects for the development of bilateral contacts. This subject becomes relevant in view of promotion of Indo-Pacific strategies by a number of countries, including Japan and the United States, and the desire to gain support from ASEAN countries in this matter, as well as the increasing strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, the persistence of cardinal disagreements on security issues in Asia between China and Japan and the ongoing conflict in the South China Sea (SCS).

Japan–Vietnam relations are usually studied as one of the components of Japan’s relations with ASEAN countries, especially in the context of expanding security cooperation [Cook 2016], or in examining Vietnam’s relations with leading regional players [Choong 2021]. It is only recently, in the light of increasing interaction, that this strategic partnership has begun to attract more focused attention of researchers. [Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong 2014; Le Hong Hiep 2017; Phan Xuan Dung 2020; Hyunh Tam Sang 2021]. At the same time, most researchers emphasizes the deepening strategic partnership, while little considering or even neglecting its limits. This article allows to fill this gap by attempting an objective analysis of interests and constraints on the way to a further rapprochement between Tokyo and Hanoi.

The synthesis of neoclassical realism and constructivism in the theory of international relations provides a theoretical and methodological basis. Neoclassical realism makes it possible to analyse the main structural characteristics and interests of two countries in their rapprochement (alignment), based on their role in the regional configuration of power and positions on regional order. In doing so, it takes into account domestic factors that influence foreign policy strategies, such as the peculiarities of strategic culture, elite positions, etc. Constructivism is useful in examining how partners perceive each other and where security threats are directed. The structural and systemic approach allows us to consider the cooperation between Japan and Vietnam in the context of Japan’s relations with the ASEAN countries and international relations in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific Region (IPR). The article is written on the basis of official sources of the relevant ministries of Japan and Vietnam in English and Japanese, research literature presented mainly by Vietnamese and to a lesser extent Japanese researchers, as well as the latest news reports. In the works of Vietnamese researchers, there is a consensus on the importance of strategic and economic interaction between the two countries and the trend towards enhanced cooperation. [Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong 2014; Le Hong Hiep 2017; Phan Xuan Dung 2020; Hyunh Tam Sang 2021]. Japanese experts view the rapprochement of Tokyo and Hanoi in the broader context of strategic competition between Japan and China and various versions of the regional order represented by the concept of a Free and Open IPR and the Belt and Road Initiative [Shoji 2020].

Evolution of relations in the spheres of politics and security

Relations between Japan and Vietnam have a long history since the 8th century, but the interaction was irregular and predominantly commercial. During the Pacific War in 1941–1945 Japan occupied French Indochina, including Vietnam, which was accompanied by the struggle of the Vietnamese against the Japanese military and the French administration that cooperated with them [Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong: 81–82]. During the partition of Vietnam, Tokyo maintained official relations with South Vietnam. Diplomatic relations with the DRV were established on September 21, 1973, eight months after the conclusion of the Paris Agreement. The proclamation of the “Fukuda doctrine” in 1977, in which Japan actually renounced its military role in the region, led to the fact that the ASEAN countries began to expand pragmatic economic cooperation with it. During the bipolar period relations with the SRV were rather cold due to the tension in the Indochina Peninsula and the involvement of Hanoi in the conflict in Cambodia [Ibid: 82].

A new period in relations between Japan and Vietnam began in the 1990s with the final end of the tensions in the Indochina Peninsula, the expansion of ASEAN and the stabilization in Southeast Asia. The Government of Japan supported the accession of the countries of the subregion to the Association and adopted policies aimed at promoting the development of the states of the Indochina Peninsula and eliminating their lag behind the rest of the countries of the group. [Ibid: 83]. Since 1992, Japan has resumed its economic assistance to Vietnam through Official Development Assistance (ODA). Since the late 2000s, Japan has institutionalized cooperation with the Greater Mekong Subregion, and since 2009, annual summits have been held with the five states of the Indochina Peninsula.

In many respects, the qualitative development of relations between Japan and Vietnam is the merit of Japanese Prime Minister S. Abe [Phan Xuan Dung 2020]. In October 2006, Prime Ministers Nguyen Tan Dung and S. Abe signed a joint statement “Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”, in which the parties agreed to enhance cooperation and dialogue in politics, security, economy, strengthen coordination and expand humanitarian contacts. Vietnam noted the importance of ODA in the country’s socio-economic development, and Japan declared its support for the “Doi Moi” renewal policy and the integration of Vietnam into the world economy [Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement 2006]. In 2007 Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet signed the “Strategic Partnership Building Agenda” which envisages the following areas of cooperation: 1) political and security dialogue, security exchanges; 2) comprehensive economic partnership; 3) assistance in strengthening legal institutions and reform promotion; 4) scientific and technical cooperation; 5) cooperation on climate, ecology, natural resources and energy; 6) improving mutual understanding; 7) cooperation in the international arena [Agenda 2009]. In April 2009, General Secretary of the VCP Central Committee Nong Duc Manh visited Japan and, together with Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro, adopted the “Japan-Vietnamese Statement on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”. The statement agreed to deepen strategic partnerships and hold annual summits and meetings of the Japan – Vietnam Cooperation Commission [Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement 2009].

These agreements have led to a significant increase in contacts between the governments, parliaments and societies of both countries. In the 2010s, there was a considerable strengthening and diversification of cooperation in the field of security [Le Hong Hiep 2017: 4]. In 2011, the countries signed a Memorandum between the Ministries of Defense on bilateral cooperation and Security Exchanges, which provided the basis both for collaboration on issues related to the coast guard and interaction at the level of Ministries of Defense, General Staffs and various branches of the armed forces. Cooperation covers both traditional and non-traditional security challenges and threats, including issues of maritime security, counter-terrorism and organized crime, cybersecurity, disaster management, search and rescue, etc. [Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong 2014: 86]. Since 2012 security policy dialogue has been established and since 2013 advisory services at the level of Deputy Ministers have been held [Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 5]. Japan is assisting Vietnam to improve training for the coastguards through joint training, advanced education programs, etc. The importance of this kind of cooperation carries a significant weight for Vietnam since the main confrontation in territorial disputes with China in the SCS is carried out at the level of the coast guard, and China possess many more ships and better equipment. [Le Hong Hiep 2017: 4–5].

After S. Abe again assumed the post of Prime Minister of Japan, in 2013 he visited all the countries of Southeast Asia, choosing Vietnam as the first. The Japanese prime minister began to emphasize the strategic importance of this region, geographically located between the Pacific and Indian oceans, he brought relations with ASEAN countries to the level of the crucial foreign policy priorities and articulated Japan’s claim to a new security role as one of the leading regional powers in the expanded Indo-Pacific area [Cook 2016]. In March 2014, the SRV President  Truong Tan Sang visited Japan, and during the summit with Japanese Prime Minister S. Abe, it was announced that the level of relations had been raised from a “strategic partnership” to a “extensive strategic partnership for peace and prosperity in Asia”, entailing a broad agenda of cooperation and a further deepening of relations [Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement 2014]. In 2017, following Prime Minister S. Abe, Vietnam was visited by the Emperor of Japan for the first time in its history [Le Hong Hiep 2017: 2].

During this period, the active deepening of ties in the field of security can be observed. Following an incident involving a drilling rig between Vietnam and the People’s Republic of China near the Paracel Islands in 2014, the Government of Japan handed over six used ships to Hanoi for the Coast Guard. In April 2016, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces visited the port of Cam Ranh for the first time and conducted joint exercises. In September 2018, the same port was visited for the first time by a JSDF submarine, which then also made its first exercises in the SCS. In June 2019, the countries held naval trainings off the southeastern coast of Vietnam, and in October a memorandum was signed in which the parties agreed to hold regular consultations at the level of deputy ministers and make frequent visits to ports [Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 5–6]. In 2015 - 2016. S. Abe promised Vietnam six new coastguard ships, and in July 2020 it was agreed that the Japan International Cooperation Agency would provide the Vietnamese Government with a concessional ODA loan of USD 347 million for this purpose. The new ships are expected to enable Vietnam to carry out more effective search-and-rescue operations, law enforcement, and to ensure safety and freedom of navigation [Japan supports 2020].

Following the resignation of S. Abe in September 2019, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide continued his predecessor’s foreign policy. He chose Vietnam as his first foreign country to be visited in October 2020. Of course, the choice was also influenced by the fact that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the two key countries that Japan’s leaders traditionally visited first – the US and the People’s Republic of China – were in fact inaccessible for visit. However, the visit to Vietnam (not to another Asian country, for example) reflects the importance that Japan attaches to its relations with it. Expanding political, security and economic cooperation became a key focus of the visit and summit of Y. Suga and his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc. The Japanese prime minister called Vietnam the cornerstone of the free and open IPR, and the Vietnamese leader supported Japan’s contribution to peace, stability and development in the region and the world as a whole. They expressed their commitment to the principles of maintaining peace, security, freedom of navigation and flight, and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the SCS. The parties also reached an agreement in principle that Japan would be able to export patrol aircraft, radars and other types of weapons, as well as military technology to Vietnam. Only in 2014, the Japanese government lifted the ban on the export of arms, military technology and dual-use products and until it is a new player in this market. Collaborating to jointly tackle the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as expanding economic ties amid Japan’s diversification of its production networks, have also become important topics on the agenda of the leaders of the two countries. They agreed to restore air traffic and create a simplified procedures for the acceptance of businessmen and workers [On Suga’s 2020].

In September 2021, Japanese Defense Minister Kishi Nobuo, during a meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart Phan Van Giang, signed an agreement allowing the export of Japanese weapons and technologies to Vietnam. It’s expected that it will expedite the implementation of the deal on the sale of coast guard ships. Vietnam, for its part, is diversifying its sources of weapons. N. Kishi stated that the parties had agreed to work together to establish a rules-based order and reaffirmed the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight [Japan inks 2021].

It was worth highlighting the fact that in March 2020, Vietnam participated in the of meeting Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in an enlarged Quad+ by videoconference. In addition to the participants of the Quad itself, namely Japan, the USA, Australia and India, the meeting was attended by representatives of South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand. The enlarged Quad meeting discussed collaboration to tackle and overcome the COVID-19 pandemic, including arrangements for regular consultations at the working level. Both Washington and Tokyo periodically made statements that other countries could be invited to the Quad, or that it could be established a separate expanded permanent Quad + format, and Vietnam is considered one of the possible members of the new alliance if it is formed. [Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 7].

Vietnamese people have a positive attitude towards Japan, as can be seen from the Japanese Foreign Ministry 2019 survey “Opinion Poll on Japan in ASEAN Countries” in which the majority of respondents were professionals or people with higher education. Japan was named the most important country for Vietnam (68%), followed by the United States (58%), South Korea (53%), and China (43%), Russia  (27 %). A similar question, formulated in the future, also showed that Japan ranked first with 54% and the US with 47%. Japan also topped the list of countries that Vietnam trusts (37%), followed by Russia (20%) and the United States (12%). China is only 2% trusted. Vietnamese are interested in Japanese economy and technology, culture and traditions, tourism and science. Friendly relations with Tokyo were named by 58% of respondents and relatively friendly – 36%, which is caused by economic cooperation (this was indicated by 70% of respondents), good relations (53%), economic development assistance (53%), Japan’s participation in solving global problems (49%) and stability of the world economy (47%). 61% of those surveyed said that Japan was contributing to the maintenance of peace and the stabilization of the international order, and 34% said it was possibly more often than it was not. In addition, 79% of respondents appreciated Japan’s contribution in support of building the ASEAN Community. Responding to the query about the countries cooperation in the implementation of the Indo-Pacific Vision of ASEAN, the respondents singled out as important such countries as the United States (53%), Japan (48%), India (39%) and China (27% ) [Kaigai 2019].

Proximity of interests and limits of rapprochement of the two countries

The reasons for this rapid intensification of cooperation are that the strategic interests of countries coincide to a high degree, no major differences exist, economic ties are close and mutually beneficial, the elites and societies of both countries trust each other. In Vietnam, it is Japan that is considered as the most promising strategic partner at the present time. [Le Hong Hiep 2017: 5–6]. The two countries do have a common strategic interest in preserving a regional order in East Asia that would allow countries to maintain their security and participate in its formatting. Japan and Vietnam do not wish to see China as the dominant power that determines the regional order in Asia and the Indo-Pacific unilaterally. The existence of territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, respectively, in which Vietnam is also faced with the conflicting PRC policy contrary to their interests, actually works for  strengthening cooperation between the two countries. As the balance of power in the region shifts for the benefit of China, it becomes more important for Vietnam to strengthen cooperation with other major regional players in order to prevent China from reshaping the regional order in its favor, particularly in terms of the territorial dispute in the SCS.  Japan is an attractive partner because it is a mighty both militarily and economically nation, which itself is interested in maintaining the balance of power in Southeast Asia [Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong 2014: 86; Le Hong Hiep 2017: 5–6; Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 5].

Clearly, Vietnam is pursuing a multi-vector policy and, although in the 2010s it began to actively develop relations with the United States and Japan because of concerns about China’s activities, it still seeks to maintain a balance between the major players and keep ASEAN’s unity and cohesion, so that the group continue to play a stabilizing role in regional security. This course serves the purpose of preserving freedom of choice and strategic maneuver [Choong 2021: 5, 8] and, given Vietnam’s potential as the fourth largest country in terms of GDP and defense spending in ASEAN, allows to arise the question of positioning it as an emerging middle power [Vershinina 2020]. Vietnam’s foreign policy has traditionally been based on the “no three” principles (not joining military alliances, not deploying the military bases of other countries, and not uniting with other countries against third states). The Vietnam Security White Paper, released in 2019, added a “fourth no” to these principles – not using force or the threat of force. Furthermore, it declared Hanoi’s readiness, if necessary, to develop security cooperation with IPR states [2019 Vietnam National Defence: 23–24].

Japan, for its part, views SEA as an important region for advancing the concept of a Free and Open IPR [Gaiko seisho 2019: 24]  and seeks the support of ASEAN countries to build a rules-based order. Tokyo endeavour to provide the countries of the region with an alternative to China, both in the economy and in the security sphere, in order to prevent it from becoming the dominant power. Vietnam is particularly significant for Japan as a country that also faces challenges from the PRC [Cook 2016: 2, Phan Xuan Dung 2020; Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 5–7]. The SCS is of strategic and economic importance to Japan, and Tokyo supports Vietnam’s position. Countries advocate compliance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, freedom of navigation and flight, peaceful resolution of the conflict, prompt adoption of the Code of Conduct of Parties in the SCS and argue against aggressive actions [Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement 2014]. On the one hand, Japan criticizes China more harshly than Vietnam. For example, it has become one of the few countries that, along with the United States and Australia, called for binding China’s compliance with the award of the 2016 Hague Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea dispute [Arbitration 2016]. On the other hand, Japan takes a more flexible and less antagonistic position in relation to the PRC than the United States, which makes it a more convenient partner.

Differences in foreign policy strategies also predetermine the limits of further rapprochement between the two countries. Japan is linked to the United States by a close military-political alliance, and Vietnam, despite strengthening relations with Tokyo and Washington, nevertheless is not ready for such relations and blocs. Vietnam is significantly inferior in integrated power to major regional powers like Japan and China. It is closely linked by relations of economic cooperation with the PRC and is not ready to take a hardline stance against Beijing because of concerns about the possible consequences of this step, especially in the territorial conflict in the SCS. Moreover, not only Vietnam-China but also China-Japan relations are characterized by asymmetric economic interdependence, and Japan itself has no interest in unduly antagonizing China. Owing to concerns about China’s possible reaction in the East China Sea, Japan, for example, does not conduct freedom of navigation operations in the SCS as the US does. In fact, Japan itself is still bound by constitutional restrictions on the use of self-defense forces abroad, and cannot be as significant a military player in the region as the United States [Le Hong Hiep 2017: 6].

In addition, Vietnam seeks to promote the “ASEAN Indo-Pacific Vision”, which presupposes maintaining a balance in the group’s relations with external players, and works to strengthen the Association’s unity and preserve its role in the region. The countries of Southeast Asia have fears that Japan is interested in them not so much as in full-fledged partners, but rather in facilities [Cook 2016: 10] that should support its views on the Free and Open IPR. The ASEAN countries, however, do not want to choose between leading players, realizing that support for a Free and Open IPR could lead to a tough reaction from China, which perceives the concept as a deterrent. And what is more, the regional players do not believe that supporting the Free and Open IPR will help them maintain the group’s central position in the regional architecture [Shoji 2020: 38–42]. In this context, of particular interest is the issue of prospects for Vietnam’s accession to Quad in the case of its expansion or the establishment of a separate, expanded format of Quad+. Tokyo and Washington indicated the interest to collaborate more intensively with Hanoi. According to experts, Vietnam’s participation in the Quad meeting in March 2020 shows that it can join this format as well in the area of security to counteract China’s policies [Hyunh Tam Sang 2021: 7; Choong 2021: 8]. At the same time, Vietnam is clearly not yet ready to accede rigid blocs, therefore, in many respects, the prospects for Hanoi’s joining this format will be determined by what its functions, goals and content will be [Choong 2021: 8] and how serious the Vietnamese leadership’s misgivings about the nature and direction of China’s foreign policy will be.

Nevertheless, despite the outlined limits, it can be assumed that strategic cooperation between Japan and Vietnam will continue to expand in the future, as it is based on a broad coincidence of mutual interests, both strategic and economic. Since S. Abe succeeded in framing the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a key pillar of Japan’s foreign policy, it is most likely that subsequent cabinets will develop this direction, and a high degree of continuity of this course is to be expected from Japan. Vietnam’s interest in maintaining the balance of power and acquiring technology is also a long-term factor. It is unlikely that countries will stop being pressured by the PRC. Moreover, Japanese businesses are interested in expanding their presence in the Vietnamese market, and this is supported through the Japanese government’s policy.


About the authors

Anna A. Kireeva

State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University)

Author for correspondence.
Email: a.kireeva@my.mgimo.ru
ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0376-9734

Associate Professor, Department of Asian and African Studies, Research Fellow, Center for Comprehensive Chinese Studies and Regional Projects

Russian Federation, Moscow


  1. Vietnam National Defence. Hanoi: National Political Publishing House, 2019. 135 p. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: http://news.chinhphu.vn/Uploaded_VGP/phamvanthua/20191220/2019Vietnam NationalDefence.pdf
  2. Agenda Toward a Strategic Partnership between Japan and Vietnam (2009). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/agenda0711.html
  3. Arbitration between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China Regarding the South China Sea (2016). Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001204.html
  4. Choong W. (2021). Vietnam and the Great Powers: Agency Amid Amity and Enmity. ISEAS Perspective, 2021 (62), May 4. 11 p.
  5. Cook M. (2016). Arena or Partners? Japan’s New Security Consensus and Southeast Asia. ISEAS Perspective, 2016 (25), May 18. 11 p.
  6. Gaiko seisho [Diplomatic Bluebook] (2019). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/2019/pdf/pdfs/1_2.pdf#page=4. (In Japanese).
  7. Hyunh Tam Sang (2021). Vietnam – Japan Relations: Growing Importance in Each Other’s Eyes. ISEAS Perspective, 2021(31), March 16. 13 p.
  8. Japan Inks Deal to Export Defense Assets to Vietnam Amid China Worry. Nikkei Asia Review, 11.09.2021. URL: https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-inks-deal-to-export-defense-assets-to-Vietnam-amid-China-worry
  9. Japan Supports Vietnam Coast Guard to Build Six Patrol Vessels. Vietnam Times, 10.07.2020. URL: https://vietnamtimes.org.vn/japan-supports-vietnam-coast-guard-to-build-six-patrol-vessels-22898.html
  10. Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement on the Establishment of the Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia (2014). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000031617.pdf
  11. Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement on the Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia (2009). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/joint0904.html
  12. Japan – Vietnam Joint Statement Toward a Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia (2006). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/vietnam/joint0610.html
  13. Kaigai ni okeru tainichi yoron chosa. Reiwa gannendo. ASEAN kekka shosai [Overseas opinion poll regarding Japan. ASEAN. Detailed results] (2019). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved on 05.09.2021 from URL: https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/100023100.pdf. (In Japanese).
  14. Le Hong Hiep (2017). The Strategic Significance of Vietnam – Japan Ties. ISEAS Perspective, 2017 (23), April 11. 8 p.
  15. On Suga's Overseas Debut, Japan, Vietnam Agree Broadly on Defence Transfer. Reuters, 19.10.2020. URL: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-southeastasia-vietnam-defence-idUSKBN2740C0
  16. Pham Quang Minh, Pham Le Da Huong (2014). Vietnam – Japan Relations in the New Context of Regional and World Politics. The bulletin of the Institute for World Affairs. Kyoto Sangyo University, 29: 81–87.
  17. Phan Xuan Dung (2020) How Abe’s Diplomatic Activism Elevated Vietnam – Japan Ties. East Asia Forum, September 26. URL: https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/26/how-abes-diplomatic-activism-elevated-vietnam-japan-ties
  18. Shoji T. (2020). “Ittai itiro” to “jiyu de hirakareta indo taiheiyo” no aida de – Tiiki titsuje o meguru kyoso to ASEAN no taio [Between “One Belt, One Road” and “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” – Competition for the Regional Order and ASEAN’s Response]. Boei kenkyuje kiyo, January, 22 (2): 21–46. (In Japanese).
  19. Vershinina V.V. (2020). Middle Powers in International Relations: Comparative Analysis of Conceptual Approaches. Comparative Politics, 11(3): (In Russian). doi: 10.24411/2221-3279-2020-10034

Copyright (c) 2021 Kireeva A.A.

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

This website uses cookies

You consent to our cookies if you continue to use our website.

About Cookies