The CPV ideological problems in the focus of the 13th CPV Congress

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The article discusses several ideological and theoretical problems the Communist Party of Vietnam faced when preparing and holding the 13th Congress at the end of January 2021. The author dwells but on some problems, in his opinion, the most important ones for the CPV, related to attempts to discredit Marxism, a loss of confidence in socialism in the country and the serious crisis in international Communist movement. These include the exacerbation of internal and external challenges facing the SRV, the division of party ranks, especially in the upper echelon, the adjustment of internal political slogans and notions of socialism, including in the light of Ho Chi Minh ideas, with the aim of scientific justification of the non-capitalist nature of the market economy and the socialist path in Viet Nam. Considering the contradictory processes in the party and in the country from the point of view of objectivism, the author concludes that, despite all the differences in positions and opinions, the congress demonstrated neither signs of ideological confusion nor disruption in the CPV.

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Introduction The 13th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) held in Hanoi on January 25 - February 1, 2021 is an important historical landmark on the way of Vietnam’s comprehensive Renovation for the last 35 years, having begun with the fateful decisions of the 6th Party Congress in 1986. It aroused interest in scientific community and in general public, while it was the question of the future of an Asian country with a hundred million population, the country that Vietnam has become. The theme of the article is new for our literature on contemporary Vietnam; it has been insufficiently discussed yet. The author’s methodology is an objective analysis of the 13th CPV Congress materials, speeches of outstanding politicians and the discussion in the Party and in academic institutions on the threshold of the Congress. The attention of most foreign observers and commentators was drawn to the formation of a new generation of the Party and State leaders and to the unprecedented re-election of 76-yeared Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV, President of the SRV, for the third term. This fact was generally assessed as the CPV leadership striving to preserve political continuity and stability [de Treglode 2021; Phuong Pham 2021]. Carlyle (Carl) Thayer, a well-known Australian expert, in his interview to the journal of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) a year before the Congress, mentioned that the CPV was going through the period of unprecedented changes within the Party. The role of the Central Committee having, in fact, taken functions of the Party chief executive body on itself in periods between national Congresses, significantly increased. Several times, the CC has already revoked the Politbureau decisions and the initiatives of the General Secretary of the CPV. Thayer assured that the Communist Party of Vietnam was still at the helm, for the simple reason that there was no change for it on the horizon. However, he was very skeptical about Nguyen Phu Trong’s re-election for the third term, having considered it to be the indicator of “sclerosis and asphyxia” of the current political system of Vietnam [Giang Nguyễn 2021]. Now, in their works western specialists pay much attention to the contradictions of the CPV ideology. It’s stated that within the Party nobody speaks of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat; market economy has never been recognized as capitalist, in fact; but private ownership is considered to be a driving force of the national development. So, what has been left over from communist doctrine in Vietnam and what socialism is being built in Vietnam? In 2018, in his speech at the Australian National University in Canberra Professor C. Thayer affirmed that the CPV, in fact, gave up the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of overthrowing capitalism closely connected with private ownership and market economy [Thayer 2018]. The same problems are touched in some articles by above-mentioned Benoit de Treglode, the Regional Director of l’Institut de recherche strategique de l’École militaire (IRSEM) in France [Vietnam before Party’s National Congress: 30.11.2020]. In Russian Vietnamese studies it was not a matter of contradictions, although many works have been published analyzing the ideological platform of the CPV, but they constitutes complimentary studies. The works of Russian researchers on Ho Chi Minh and his role in the CPV creation and formation of its Marxist-Leninist ideology are notable for their comprehensive approach. The main features of the CPV history are contained in the still relevant book of Ye.V. Kobelev about Ho Chi Minh [Kobelev 1983] and its contemporary policy is given in a collective work “Ho Chi Minh’s spiritual Legacy and Contemporaneity” published by Sankt-Petersburg University jointly with the Ho Chi Minh Academy [2015]. IFES scientists have contributed to the book. Ye.V. Kobelev as a leading researcher of CPV in Russia, characterized the CPV XIII congress as a step “on the way to new achievements” and emphasizes: “Before the birth of the CPV no other party could head the Vietnamese people and lead it to victory. The first and foremost factor is the strategy of the united broad national front at every concrete stage of the revolution [Kobelev 2021]. In Russia the study of the Ho Chi Minh's heritage is carried out by the Institute of the same name of the Oriental Faculty of St. Petersburg State University. Its director, prof. Kolotov V.N., regularly analyzes the policy and strategy of the CPV in general and he was the first who gave an overview of the XIII congress [Kolotov 2021: 30-40]. He advocates the concept of the presence of the Ho Chi Minh ideology in Vietnam [Ho Chi Minh ideology 2017]. Naturally, the paramount attention to development and propaganda of the CPV ideology is paid in Vietnam itself. The broad system of research, educational and propaganda institutions with numerous specialists work actively there. The most important institutions are the following: the Central Theoretical Council of the Central Committee of the CPV, the Ho Chi Minh State Political Academy, the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences and many other “think tanks”. Theoretical works of the representatives of the Party elite are published in the journals “The Communist”, “The Party Building”, “The Political Theory” and many others. This article is based on some of them. Recently, great attention has been attracted to the articles and speeches of Nguyen Trong Nghia, Colonel-General, the former Deputy Chief of the General Political Department of the VPA, appointed the Head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPV after the Congress [Bảo vệ nền tảng tư tưởng: 27.01.2021]. CPV in the face of internal and external challenges The SRV according to its social set-up positions itself to be one of the five socialist states left. But it does not belong to such stagnating countries like Cuba, DPRK and Laos. In December 1986, following the decisions of the 6th Congress of the CPV the country began a historical experiment of building “socialism-oriented market economy”, which found its expression in the acceptance of mixed economy and the foreign policy openness. During 35 years of the realization of this policy Vietnam having no friends and allies after the USSR collapse, has changed into a quickly developing state. Also, COVID-19 pandemic has shown that in the force majeure situation Vietnam has been able to build harmonious relations with its own society. Yet, in January 2021 the 13th Congress of the CPV was not held in the state of euphoria of successes. By the time, economic, internal and international political situation of Vietnam had been far from blissful idyll. The consequences of the world crisis due to COVID-19 pandemic was a blow strong enough (though not so strong as in the neighboring countries) to the Vietnamese economy dependent on export and tourism. The CPV reforms and enhancing openness of the country to the external world led to the complication of the social structure, diversification of interests and mass conscience, to emergence of new contradictions and conflicts in the society, particularly during informatics revolution in the world. Social polarization, the estrangement of political and business elite from the mass of the population increased significantly. There appeared “new Vietnamese”, somewhat similar to “new Russian” of the 1990s in Russia. The CPV leadership was obliged to renovate the ideological arsenal in order not to lose their legitimacy, but to strengthen the social foundation of the power. Meanwhile, international situation of the country has also been greatly affected by more active expansionist policy of the PRC in the South China (East) Sea, which required increased defense spending. The situation for the CPV was complicated by a deep crisis in the international Communist and labor movement, as well. Even during “the crusade against Communism” Communist parties remained the vanguard of leftist forces. Some decades ago, they still were a powerful force that everyone should have taken into consideration. Now, the situation has principally changed, and the influence of Communist parties in the world, in fact, has come to naught. Ideological and theoretical crisis has spread worldwide. Theoretical and ideological dilemma of the current socialism results from the complete deviation, both in theory and in practice, from the main motto of the Communist Manifesto: “Workers of the world, unite!” The CPV no longer refers to the working class as the leading force of society, and the new situation needs new theoretical, ideological and political formulations. So far, there is no ideology that could seize the masses. In this context, the CPV is not the exclusion. The discussion that spread in the Party and in society before the Congress evidences that despite all its indisputable achievements, the CPV still faces the critic of the Party members minority (ever growing) and non-party intelligentsia, who are trying to change some ideological postulates in Party documents. However, those who waited and pushed for big changes in the CPV policy were disappointed. The CPV leadership did not wish to vitally change anything in its policy; according to many indicators and plans for the future it looked quite favorably to the authorities. That is why the 13th Congress of the CPV was marked by continuity and unity. The Congress submitted preservation and defense of the CPV ideological principles as one of the most important tasks for the near future. New intra-party thoughts Usually, Vietnam’s political leadership discusses political issues behind closed doors. But the facts filtering through social nets evidence that in the leadership there are different groups competing with one another on numerous questions. Since the late 1980s, after the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union fell apart, the CPV was to choose, whether to preserve to existing political system or to change it. The conservative part of the CPV leadership did everything possible to preserve the political system and social stability in the country under the CPV guidance. Usually, Vietnamese conservatism was closely connected with anti-Westernism. But after the crisis in Sino-Vietnamese relations in 2014 the situation began to change. Vietnam began moving away from China and trying to become friends with the US, though very carefully. Meanwhile technocrats-officials in counterpoise to Party ideologists and enforces exerted great influence. It was they who assisted to bring foreign capital to the country, who administered market reforms. The reformers were guided by the ideas of the country modernization according to Western model and were interested in attaching it to the emerging globalization. The key point of their policy was integration into the world economy. Some of them considered it possible to reject the goal of establishing a socialist state and to remain a national-democratic country at that stage. Supporters of this course called for a second, more radical phase of reform (“Renovation 2”). It relied on the active US lobbying and emerged from the real development of the society, all the political institutions of the country, capitalist economy, which nobody could stop. By contrast with them conservatives always come out in favor of continuation of the struggle “against imperialism”, implying the West on the whole, and against the so called “peaceful evolution”, i.e., against gradual regeneration of the political system in Vietnam. The main way for them is the establishment of close union with China on the base of common ideology of the two ruling Communist parties. Many western observers share the opinion that Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary for the third term, is the conservatives’ leader and heads the pro-China faction. The reformers’ faction leader is considered to be the former Premier, now the SRV President, Nguyen Xuan Phuc, who has never been either a democrat or a liberal. He represented technocratic wing in the CPV and enhanced high authority on the background of successful actions during the pandemic [Giáo sư Carl Thayer: 14.01.2021]. However, in time the role of the oligarchy in market economy has become still more notable through the owners of big private companies. A new elite layer, “red capitalists”, has emerged. [Việt Nam có 6 tỷ phú: 17.04.2021], in which dollar billionaires take prominent place. They not only earn great incomes and power, they also contest with each other, creating new conditions for “pluralism of interests”. The “renters’ faction”, according to external observers, is the most influential of all the groupings in the CPV. In their interests they do not share mindsets of conservatives or reformers, but seek what will bring them bigger income. These new forces are striving to get rid of narrow frameworks of the political regime and control of party leaders, often incompetent. As Bill Hayton, the expert of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, writes in the book “Vietnam Rising Dragon” published in 2010, Vietnam is gradually transforming into the state ruled by the groupings of finance oligarchy. The expert strongly believes that there have appeared very rich people, who have close connections with party officials and who can influence policy and economy for their own advantage. The Party seems to admit them to be useful and to be used as the tool for the realization of the CPV policy [Hayton 2010b]. The change of mottos, but not of policy The 13th Congress of the CPV has had the motto: “Unity - Democracy - Order - Creativity - Development”. In comparison with the previous Congress, the motto lacks the words “Justice” and “Renovation”, while the appeals to creativity and development have appeared instead. The appeal to unity, as usual, addresses both the Party and the people. At the time of the Congress the CPV had 5,2 million members, i.e., 5,3% of 97 million population. [Đảng viên Đảng Cộng sản Việt Nam: 18.01.2021]. Of course, this is less than in China, where 92 million members of the CPC account for 6,3% of 1,4 billion population [Naselenie Kitaya: 18.01.2021]. But, as the practice has shown, to guide such a party from the center is still more complicated. Provincial centers’ loyalty to the party headquarters in Hanoi often depends on provision got from the center for these provinces’ needs. It was clearly seen at the previous Congress at the election of the ruling “four” of the Party and the country. The former staff of the Central Committee of the CPV could not agree on some candidates nominated by the CC Politbureau. Also, the motto “Democracy” is repeated at every Congress. However, the CPV understands the term in its own way. It flatly rejects the principle of political pluralism and separation of powers. These basic elements of Western democracy are considered to contradict the existing power system in the country, to undermine political stability, national culture and identity. In this context, the first place belongs to the National Assembly, recently being a real “discussion place”. Its role and authority have obviously increased. Now, significant part of deputies works on an ongoing basis. The electoral system is being improved, providing for the contest of no less than three candidates for one place. In the new parliament, elected in March 2021, about 20% deputies are not the CPV members. Its open sessions on questions and answers of the government provide live broadcast on TV and radio. Every deputy has his own site in internet, and the electors can ask any questions and must receive a reply. For the first time in the history of Vietnam, the National Assembly was delegated the right to put to the vote the question of confidence to senior government officials twice during their tenure. Formerly, the motto “Justice” was controversial in society and became all the more surprising in the context of growing property differentiation. It was replaced with the appeal to “order and discipline”. It must evidence that the CPV leadership heads for building “the socialist state of law”, being legal. Article 4 of the SPV Constitution 1993 on the leading role of the CPV, in chapter 3 declares that all the CPV organizations and members must act in the frameworks of the Constitution and the Law [Hiến pháp 2014: 5]. In practice this means that the company of fighting corruption having been begun by the current leadership will be continued. As far as the renovation in economy is concerned, the CPV leadership has decided that by now the renovation having been planned 35 years ago has come to its end. The challenges posed by so-called fourth industrial revolution are on the agenda: digitalization of economy, building “smart cities” and others. This task requires “smart”, i.e., educated and qualified citizens living in the cities, and rational management. That is why the motto “Renovation” was resolved to be replaced by “Creativity” and “Development”, but this does not mean that the process of renovation and reforms has been finished. The aim to continue renovation has been fixed in the 13th Congress of the CPV decisions, as well as the task of significant GDP growth and the strategy of medium- and long-term (until 2045) development. Marxism-Leninism or Ho Chi Minh’s teaching The CPV created by Ho Chi Ming brought Marxism-Leninism to Vietnam 91 years ago. This ideology is still of great importance in the life of the CPV and of the society. It is supported with the mighty propaganda and agitation machinery of the Party and State. The CPV response to the significant devaluation of Marxist-Leninist ideology in the world has been the mighty propaganda of Ho Chi Minh’s teaching, its nucleus being the propagation of high morals on the ground of traditional Confucian and Buddhist values, as well as condemnation of individualism and aspiration to personal enrichment. But recently in the ideological sphere the opposition in the milieu of the Party and other intelligentsia in the country (but particularly in diaspora) enhanced attacks at Marxism-Leninism, being the CPV chief ideological base. The CPV calls them “hostile forces” in the party lexicon. Their arguments are aimed to break dialectical relationship of Ho Chi Minh’s teaching with Marxism-Leninism. The CPV opponents argue that now in Vietnam Marxism-Leninism is out of date, as it is worldwide, and it is leading the country to a dead-lock. Only Ho Chi Minh’s teaching is actual and practical, as are his ideas expressed in different times and on different occasions. But now, they say, it is obvious that individualism and materialism are gaining the upper hand and become dominating among the young generation. Joining the CPV is for the youth, first and foremost, the choice of bureaucratic career, but not the choice of an ideal. Naturally, such an opposition of Ho Chi Minh’s teaching to the Marxism in the CPV leadership does not mean an attempt to raise Ho Chi Minh’s ideas, but, vice versa, to separate them from their roots in Marxist-Leninist theory, having emasculated their sense. This is a blow to the CPV ideological base, to its program and to its leadership in the country. Ho Chi Minh’s ideas mean Marxism-Leninism creative use and development as applied to concrete Vietnam’s conditions. That is why (so the CPV leadership) one should neither absolutize Ho Chi Minh’s ideas in order to deny Marxism-Leninism, nor break their relationship, nor substitute them for Marxism [Không thể tách rời: 29.12.2020]. In this connection there are serious doubts about the semantic dispute of our Saint Petersburg colleague Professor V.N. Kolotov around a supposedly wrong translation of the term «Тư tưởng Hồ Chí Minh» as “Ho Chi Minh’s ideas”. He believes this translation to belittle the importance of his ideological legacy and insists that it should be translated as “Ho Chi Minh’s ideology” [Kolotov 2017: 59-60]. But President Ho Chi Minh has never thought himself to be a theorist or an ideologist of the Communist Party of Vietnam he had created. On the contrary, he used to emphasize that his ideology is Marxism-Leninism with regard to Vietnam’s national and cultural features [Hồ Chí Minh 2011: 147]. Understanding of the Socialism After the USSR collapse, this is the fundamental issue of the CPV ideological life. Officially, the CPV goal, as usual, is the construction of socialism in Vietnam. In his report at the Congress Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV, mentioned again the task to transform the SRV by the middle of the century into a “modern developed state moving towards socialism” [Báo cáo chính trị: 23.03.2021]. The CPV Program in a new wording having been adopted by the 11th Congress, shows socialism as a very distant ideal to strive to. It emphasizes that the transition to it is a long, extraordinary complicated process. No time frames are ever mentioned. The country is said to be at the earliest stage of socialism construction and will remain there indefinitely. By the middle of the 21st century it is supposed to create its material and technical base on the whole [Cương lĩnh: 15.03.2021]. In spite of the hardest circumstances the Renovation led Vietnam out of the category of the poorest countries of the world into the group of average-income states. At that, some viewed in Vietnam an attempt of convergence of capitalist and socialist development models [Mazyrin 2007], others see the construction of a “Confucian capitalism with a human face” [Hayton 2010a]. But Vietnamese ideologists of this policy insist that in the end all their reforms aim to the construction of socialism regarding national specificities. The real meaning of this, is expressed in the chief motto of renovation policy: “wealthy people, powerful state, just, democratic, civilized society” [Cương lĩnh: 15.03.2021]. In this interpretation of socialism there are few “isms”, i.e., doctrinaire attitude, but much more common sense. This definition of socialism hardly differs from the goals declared by social-democratic parties of many countries of Western Europe, viz.: justice, democracy, social economy, prosperity, but one, which is the monopoly of the Communist Party for power. In addition to its own formulation of the substance of socialism in general, the CPV advocates a specific understanding of the nature of the market economy: “Commodity production does not oppose socialism; it is the achievement of universal human civilization and exists as an objective necessity for socialism construction” [Nguyễn Phú Trọng 2010]. Characteristically, the Lenin's thesis about the possibility of socialism construction having left out the capitalist development stage is preserved at the same time. Nguyen Phu Trong, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPV, considers this conception to be “the essential theoretical breakthrough and the Party creative achievement”, its important contribution to the Marxist-Leninist theory. He argues that Vietnamese Communists made the conclusion of the necessity “to apply economic forms and market economy management methods to use their positive qualities…” [Nguyễn Phú Trọng 2010]. However, the CPV theorists recognize that market economy has tendencies really contradictory to socialism, by proposing to decisively overcome and limit them. This is done, inter alia, on the basis of the unity of economic and social policy, where economic growth keeps up with social progress. Naturally, there are many opponents of this conception within Vietnam. They reject the very possibility of socialism-oriented market economy, believing, these two concepts are incompatible. Market economy in canonical representation means freedom of enterprise from Sate interference, the dominance of private property. For example, many meetings before the 13th Congress of the CPV proposed to change the Land Law 2013 and to adopt private land ownership. The CPV leadership considered this to be untimely. The maintenance of the people’s (state) land ownership is considered to be in accordance with the principles of socialism-oriented market economy. Many CPV veterans see also negative consequences of strengthening market economy, while it is an inexhaustible source of irresistible corruption in the Party and state. Critics in the CPV are of the opinion that to overcome the situation it is necessary to possess an independent court, civil rights and opposition parties controlling the ruling elites. Yet, Vietnam is far from that. Conclusion The above-said is far from having exhausted all the ideological problems being actively discussed in the CPV. With a high degree of certainty one can affirm that there are many different positions and opinions in the CPV, but there are no signs of ideological disorder, let alone the split. One of the main tasks of the CPV is to create the atmosphere of social cohesion, to overcome the remains of lasting hostility and demarcation in the society. The broad layers of the people should adopt some consequences of the mixed market economy with its inequality of incomes, life levels and difference in interests of classes and layers.

About the authors

G. M Lokshin

Institute of Far East Studies Russian Academy of Sciences

PhD (History), Leading Researcher, Center for Vietnam and ASEAN Studies. ORCID: 0000-0002-6362-7463


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