Chinese and Soviet economic and technical aid to North Vietnam, 1955-60

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Introduction Most of the existing scholarship on Soviet and Chinese aid to North Vietnam during the 1950s contend that Hanoi’s hefty dependence on China’s aid caused Hanoi to side with China against the Soviet Union ideologically. Most recently historian Li Danhui and Yafeng Xia, who relied on extensive documentary evidence from Chinese archives, contend that prior to the end of 1964, the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) mainly relied on Chinese aid, and that provided the basis for the Chinese Communist Party to win over the VWP in its struggle against Soviet revisionism [Li and Xia 2018:133]. On the Soviet side, Mari Olsen and Ilya Gaiduk contended that from mid-1955 the Soviet Union both expanded and formalized its relations with North Vietnam, but Moscow handed over the military responsibility in Indochina to the Chinese while Moscow’s economic and technological to North Vietnam remained very low key because Vietnam was not of primary strategic interest to the Soviet Union [Olsen 2014: 112-3; Gaiduk 2003]. On the Vietnamese side, scholars somewhat disagreed on the level of Hanoi’s pragmatism or lack thereof in response to the onset of the Sino-Soviet split in 1956. Political scientist Tuong Vu claimed that in 1957 Hanoi’s leaders were willing to ideologically and politically side with Beijing’s leaders against Khrushchev’s denunciation of his predecessor, Stalin, to the detriment of the North Vietnam’s efforts to gain greater amount of material aid from the Soviet Union. To be sure, Vu wrote: “The Vietnamese party was not the only communist party that defended Stalin. Yet its defense of a dead leader at the risk of alienating the incumbent is clear evidence that ideological loyalty trumped practical interests” [Vu 2017: 152]. However, historian Pierre Asselin revealed that internally many members of the VWP Central Committee summoned to discuss the meaning of and a collective response to Khrushchev’s February 1956 speech opposed Moscow’s unilateral turn to the policy of peaceful coexistence with West and Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin’s personality cult, but publicly the VWP collective leadership “praised the correctness of the views espoused by Khrushchev” [Asselin 2013: 35-36]. Asselin further asserted, “At minimum, it [VWP] has to pretend to be loyal [to Moscow]” given North Vietnam’s dependence on Moscow’s political and material backing [Asselin 2013: 36]. For Lien-Hang Nguyen, the Sino-Soviet split also caused a split within the VWP leadership between the “North-firsters” led by Premier Pham Van Dong and General Vo Nguyen Giap and “South-firsters” led by Le Duan and Le Duc Tho [Nguyen 2012:43]. The North-firsters, who supported the political struggle and economic development of North Vietnam that would ultimately defeat the South, invoked Khrushchev’s peaceful coexistence, whereas the South-firsters, who supported reunification through war, hailed Mao’s anti-imperialist lines to advance their cause of unifying Vietnam by military means [Nguyen 2012: 42]. By implication, this line of argument suggests that the split into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions allowed both Beijing and Moscow to find some satisfaction that their respective ideological allies were doing their bidding within the VWP. Yet, she argued that “Beijing wielded more influence over Hanoi’s policies than Moscow did” because of Hanoi’s heavy dependence on Chinese aid [Nguyen 2012: 41-42]. In summary, scholars who focused on bringing Vietnamese perspectives into light differed on the extent to which Hanoi was willing to side with Beijing against Krushchev’s revisionism, but agreed that when push comes to shove, Hanoi sided with Beijing in the second half of the 1950s. This paper provides a nuanced account of Hanoi’s pragmatism in its aid diplomacy toward Beijing and Moscow. I argue that while China’s generous economic and technical aid to North Vietnam was crucial for importing consumption goods from China, developing light industry and agriculture in North Vietnam, modern industrial equipment, advanced technology, and Soviet specialists from the Soviet Union became ultimately necessary for North Vietnam to build up its industrial base in the late 1950s. In actually, Hanoi’s leaders used every available opportunity to impress upon Moscow’s leaders their commitment to the Soviet leadership of the socialist camp and improve economic relations with the Soviet bloc. The disastrous consequences of North Vietnam’s China-modelled land reform which unravelled in 1956 and Hanoi’s emphasis on building up the industrial base of North Vietnam’s economy in the 1958-1960 plan further compelled Hanoi to seek greater economic and technical assistance from the Soviet Union. The Fallouts of Vietnam’s Land Reform, 1953-1956 After 1955, as Mao’s national security concerns regarding its southern buffer zone grew with the American involvement in Vietnam, China’s aid to North Vietnam became more diverse and complex, and therefore institutionalized to ensure maximum impact [Zhang 2014: 208]. To exert Chinese influence in North Vietnam’s socialist economic development, Beijing significantly expanded Chinese aid programs in areas of critical needs, including transportation infrastructure (railroads, roads and bridges), economic planning, personnel training, and production of consumption goods. In January 1953, the Fourth Plenum of the VWP passed a resolution calling for land reform in the liberated zones, a policy drawing directly on China’s rich land reform experiences; the Chinese were also eager to transplant their model in the DRV [Zhai 2000: 39]. To erode the Vietnamese populace’s resistance to the VWP leadership’s land reform program, the Vietnamese Ministry of Culture of the DRV initially showed Chinese films to villagers throughout North Vietnam [Kerkvliet 2005: 44]. As Christopher Goscha observed, “Since 1950, Vietnamese communists had already imported Marxism-Leninism and a heavy dose of Maoism to structure the party-state in the marquis, indoctrinate a faithful bureaucracy and a fresh military caste, and transform the society and its economy in the communist mold” [Goscha 2016: 291]. Pham Quang Minh, whose research drew on new materials from the Party archives in Hanoi, contends that Chinese advisors played a “decisive role in the policy formulation, methods, and direction of North Vietnam’s land reform [Pham 2015:95; also see Zhai 2000: 42]. General secretary of the VWP Central Committee Truong Chinh and his closest associates Le Van Luong, Hoang Quoc Viet, and Ho Viet Thang, who had been zealous supporters of modelling North Vietnam’s land reform after China’s were demoted at the Tenth Plenum of the VWP Central Committee in September-October 1956 [Asselin 2013: 39; Duc 2012: 142]. According to Goscha, the most reliable estimates put the number of death between 5,000 and 15,000, and hundreds, possibly thousands, committed suicide, while others fled [Goscha 2016: 294]. Yet an internal record of VWP revealed a much larger number of victims. During his visit to Hanoi in November 1956, Premier Zhou Enlai expressed regret that some 80,000 landlords were “disciplined” [meaning “on trial” and/or “executed,” emphasis added], but that was necessary because the Vietnamese feudal landowning class was deeply influenced by capitalist ideology [Pham 2015: 96]. Beijing’s leaders made concerted efforts in late 1956 and early 1957 to reaffirm a narrative of the success of land reform efforts to the Vietnamese leadership. In a letter to Vietnamese minister of foreign affairs Nguyen Duy Trinh on November 8, 1956, Chinese ambassador to North Vietnam Lou Guibo faulted Hanoi’s leaders for their incorrect assessment of the level of resistance to the land reform program by the landlord class after the August 1945 revolution [Pham 2015: 95-96]. However, Zhou Enlai rushed to assure Vietnamese leaders that the land reform was a major success because rice production surpassed expectations by four million tons and hundreds of thousands of peasants became landowners [Pham 2015: 96]. He added that the capitalist ideology was deeply ingrained in the intelligentsia in Vietnam, and therefore these reactionaries had to be crushed; otherwise they would find ways to oppose the socialist revolution [Pham 2015: 96]. On April 22, 1957, Mao praised visiting Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong with his comment, “Regarding land reform, Vietnam carried it out more correctly and calmly than China. It is basically a success” [Pham 2015: 97]. Since the Vietnamese leadership was dealing with the negative effects of land reform excesses in 1957, Mao’s flattering remark did not square with Hanoi’s post-mortem of the crisis. Historian Qiang Zhai succinctly observed: “Burned by the land reform experience, Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues would gradually veer from the Maoist model of mass mobilization, class struggle, and continuous revolution toward the Soviet model of centralization and managerial control in the late 1950s” [Zhai 2000: 76]. Courting Soviet aid while praising Chinese generosity, 1955-1960 After 1956, DRV diplomacy was intended to avoid infuriating Beijing or Moscow to the detriment of losing material aid from both patrons. In early April 1956, Moscow dispatched Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan to Hanoi to impress upon the VWP leadership the seriousness of its commitment to peaceful coexistence with the West [Asselin 2013: 35]. Hanoi rolled out the red carpet for the Soviet delegation’s visit. Shortly after the Mykoyan delegation left Hanoi, the Propaganda Committee of the VWP Central Committee reported to the VWP leadership on April 10 that it had deployed the full power of its propaganda apparatus to laud the Soviet Union’s achievements and leadership of the socialist bloc, and its peaceful coexistence policy [PTT, File 7499: 69]. In January 1957, the Soviet proposal that the United Nations admit both North and South Vietnam as independent members only confirmed Vietnamese leaders’ belief that Moscow was willing to change its politics without considering North Vietnam’s core interests [Zhai 2000: 79]. Yet, in the same year, Hanoi churned out numerous publications defending the Soviet Union from revisionist “slanders,” and formally acknowledged the Soviet Union as the leader of the socialist bloc [Vu 2016: 152-153]. Similarly Hanoi’s leaders never ceased to impress upon Beijing’s leaders their commitment to the special relationship between Vietnam and China, and their gratitude for Beijing’s backing. The “Sino-Vietnamese brotherly-plus-comrades” discourse was pervasive in the Vietnamese media throughout the 1950s [Path 2011:126]. In return, Moscow and Beijing expressed their support for Hanoi in kind during the second half of the 1950s. In terms of military aid, North Vietnam received a total of 49,585 tons. Hanoi received 29,996 tons from the Soviet Union, 22,982 tons from China and 441 tons from other socialist countries [Lê Văn Thịnh 2012: 48-55]. Soviet and Chinese economic assistance to North Vietnam also increased substantially during the second half of the 1950s. After 1956, according to Chinese historian Shu Guang Zhang, China expected its economic aid to North Vietnam to yield increased political leverage [Zhang 2014: 211]. In late 1956, Beijing established an office of economic representatives in Hanoi and appointed Fang Yi, who later served as minister of Foreign Economic Relations, as the first chief representative. Fang Yi devoted extensive effort to studying how China’s aid to North Vietnam could best promote a close relationship between the two governments, emphasizing three main criteria: (1) China’s aid projects should ensure significant Chinese impact on Vietnam’s economy; (2) China’s aid program should differ from that of its Soviet counterpart by being based strictly on the “actual situation” in Vietnam; and (3) China should conduct more on-the-spot training of Vietnamese technicians so as to deepen the teacher-student relationship between the Chinese and North Vietnamese comrades [Zhang 2014: 211]. On April 22, 1957, Mao Zedong counselled the visiting Premier Pham Van Dong during a dinner reception that “Comrades, avoid the big mistakes Eastern European countries made” [Pham Quang Minh 2015: 97]. According to Mao, that mistake was that these countries followed the Soviet economic model and prioritized heavy industry over agriculture. In early 1958, Beijing approved a long-term economic aid commitment to Hanoi [Zhang 2014: 212]. In actuality, Hanoi needed both Chinese and Soviet economic and technical assistance because thee different types of aid both patrons provided played complimentary roles in addressing North Vietnam’s economic needs. But clearly Hanoi’s leaders desired more sophisticated aid from the Soviet bloc. As Hanoi’s leaders shifted from Vietnam’s post-war economic reconstruction and the completion of the land reform in 1955-57 to the economic reform and development in 1958-1960, they desired to build up the industrial base of North Vietnam’s economy as they continued to reform and prioritize the agricultural sector [PTT, File 8251: 2]. From 1955 to 1957, North Vietnam’s economy was mostly based on agricultural production. Food production covered 95 % of the overall agricultural output of which rice cultivation alone amounted to 85 %. Industrial base was nearly non-existent with the exception of one industrial commodity, i.e. coal mining; in 1955 North Vietnam produced 600,000 tons of coal, and was able to increase its coal production to 1.1 million tons in 1957 [PTT, File 8251: 1]. In short, North Vietnam’s economy stagnated in 1955-1957. For 1958-1960, Hanoi planned to focus on construction, production of raw materials, and the development of light industry [PTT, File 8251: 2]. To meet this goal, Hanoi sought greater economic and technical aid from both China and the Soviet bloc to adequately address North Vietnam’s dire need for economic development. During the second half of the 1950s, Beijing provided Hanoi with massive assistance in capital, equipment, raw materials, specialists, and the training of Vietnamese technicians; China’s aid was extremely crucial for North Vietnam’s economic recovery after the First Indochina War [PTT, File 8600: 6]. Notably China’s aid to North Vietnam during this period accounted for 43 % of the entire socialist bloc’s aid [PTT, File 8600: 19]. China’s nonrefundable economic and technical aid alone accounted for one third of the socialist bloc’s aid to North Vietnam during this period [PTT, File 8600: 2]. During the 1955-1960 period, China provided a total capital of 1.2 billion renminbi of which nonrefundable aid amounted to 900 million (800 million in 1955 and 100 million in 1959); 300 million was given as a long-term loan in 1959 (for details, see stable below). Out of the 1.2 billion renminbi, 638 million renminbi was used for economic development and 262 million renminbi for military expenses [PTT, File 8600: 19]. For the 1955-1960 period, the Soviet aid to North Vietnam totalled 560 million rubles [about half a billion US dollars] including 530 million rubles for economic assistance and 30 million rubles for military aid, accounting for 35% of the total nonrefundable aid and loans from the socialist bloc [PTT, File 8004: 2]. For the period 1955-1960 alone, Moscow provided a total of over 300 million rubles in nonrefunable aid and loans. In seven agreements from 1955 to 1960, Moscow provided a total loan of 208 million rubles [PTT, File 8004: 1-2]. Hence, during the period 1955-1960, aid packages from the Soviet bloc and Chinese aid worth nearly 2.3 billion Vietnamese dong were absolutely crucial for North Vietnam’s the economic recovery and development (see Table 1). Table 1. The Situation of the Use of Aid and Loan from 1955 to 1960 and the Remaining Fund for 1961 Countries Foreign Currency Vietnamese Currency (VND) I. Aid USSR 400 million rubles 439,586,419 Poland 30 million zlotys 32,691,251 Czechoslovakia 35 million rubles 38,568,920 China Economic (600 million renminbi) and military (300 million renminbi) 696,264,121 and 353,894,484 GDR 60 million rubles 71,654,726 Hungary 8,5 million rubles 9,132.988 Rumania 15 million rubles 19,050,000 Bulgaria -* 3,162,227 Albania -* 632,000 Mongolia -* 389,891 Total in rubles 518,5 million 577,993,053 Total in renminbi 900 million 1,050,158,606 Zlotys 30 million 32,691,251 Total VND 1,665,018,027 II. Long-term Loan USSR 30 million rubles (military aid) &130 million rubles (economic aid) 34,570, 143 and 165,100,000 Poland 20 million zlotys 25,400,000 Czechoslovakia 15 million rubles 18,574,148 Romania 10 million rubles 12,700,000 Hungary 10 million rubles 12,700,000 China 300 million renminbi 357,000,000 Total in rubles 195 million 269,044,209 Total in renminbi 300 million 357,000,000 Total VND 626,044,290 *Information is not specified. Source: [BTC, File 9490, 49-50] For the 1955-59 period, Hanoi used a total of over 363 million rubles in Soviet aid to pay for the import of Soviet industrial equipment, spare parts, and the costs of Soviet specialists (over 41 million rubles or 12% of the total aid) [BTC, File 9490: 49-50]. By comparison, Hanoi used China’s non-refundable aid of over 442 million renminbi to purchase machinery and equipment, spare parts, costs of Chinese specialists in North Vietnam, and other consumption goods. 83% of this amount or over 362 million renminbi was used to pay for the two categories of goods namely light equipment and consumption goods from China [BTC, File 9490: 63]. Hence Hanoi imported different categories of material aid from China and the Soviet Union. Hanoi desired more sophisticated machinery and equipment from the Soviet Union and East Germany for its industrial buildup but relied more on imported consumption goods and light equipment from China to support its light industry sector. A total of 4,627 Chinese specialists served in North Vietnam from 1954 to 1960. In late1954-1955, Beijing dispatched a total of 1,042 Chinese technicians to repair railroads connecting Hanoi to China’s southwestern railway network [PTT, File 2213: 1]. In addition, Beijing sent 3,585 Chinese specialists to North Vietnam from 1955 to 1960 in various departments of local and central authorities. In November 1956, Premier Zhou Enlai admitted to the Politburo of the VWP that in the past years China had sent “many [economic] advisors and specialists” but also “a large number of workers” to help Vietnam. Zhou admitted that some Chinese workers had made troubles in Vietnam because they were not well educated. Zhou further conceded, “Some Chinese advisors pressured Vietnamese comrades to accept their views,” but he also lodged a complaint that some Vietnamese officials were “rude” to Chinese advisors and workers and treated them badly. Zhou further apologized to the Vietnamese Politburo for the poor quality of those railroads and bridges the Chinese built in 1954-55. He promised to recall them back to China and dispatch Chinese engineers to build up North Vietnam’s transportation infrastructure [Pham 2015: 97]. As it turned out, 1,042 Chinese technicians were quickly and unceremoniously withdrawn [PTT, File 2213: 1]. They had returned to China so abruptly that the Vietnamese government did not even have a chance to officially honour them for their contributions in 1954-55. Chinese historians Zihua Shen and Danhui Li asserted that Beijing’s leaders decided [in 1955] to recall all Chinese advisors and workers from Vietnam, except specialists, because they were well aware of a similar problem with Soviet advisors in China - that is Soviet advisors lacked a good understanding of China’s special conditions and their advice was harmful to China’s economy [Shen and Li 2011: 129]. Nonetheless, the Office of Economic Affairs at the Chinese embassy in Hanoi sent a detailed name list of 1,042 Chinese specialists who mostly served North Vietnam in 1954-1955, and suggested that they too deserved such recognition [PTT, File 2213: 2]. In the end, the Vietnamese Department of Foreign Specialists honored such a request. By, September 1964, China sent a total of 4,839 Chinese specialists to North Vietnam to build China-aided industrial projects, agricultural sector, transportation, and culture. Hanoi expressed immense gratitude to Beijing’s leaders for this because these technicians were greatly needed in China at that time. By 1965, China also had trained 4,513 Vietnamese technicians and provided scholarships for 1,157 Vietnamese students to receive training and education in China [PTT, File 8600: 20, 28]. In its internal evaluation, the head of Vietnam’s department of foreign specialists noted: “China’ technical aid made an extremely important contribution to the development of our technological know-how, organization of tasks, and economic leadership” [PTT, File 8600: 20]. From 1955 to 1960, Moscow sent 1,344 Soviet specialists to North Vietnam of which 1,088 received Friendship Medals from North Vietnamese government. A Vietnamese historian Le Van Thinh reported a slightly higher fugure at 1,547 Soviet specialists for the same period. According to Le, these Soviet specialists trained 7,000 Vietnamese technicians in various economic fields in North Vietnam [Lê Văn Thịnh 2012: 50-51]. Hanoi’s hiring of Soviet specialists increased in the ensuing years reaching 3,085 by 1966; out of this number, 2,345 Soviet specialists were to help the North Vietnamese government build up industrial projects and train them to use modern factory equipment imported from the Soviet Union. Hanoi only used 408 Soviet specialists for the fields of education, culture and public health. [PTT, File 2303: 2]. The complimentary roles of Soviet and Chinese aid packages in North Vietnam’s economic development between 1955 and 1960 was undeniably a major factor in the North Vietnamese leadership’s consideration as they attempted steer clear of openly siding with Beijing against Moscow after the Sino-Soviet rift after 1956. Yet, toward the end of the 1950s, Hanoi’s leaders clearly desired more sophisticated aid from the Soviet bloc to compensate for what China was not able to provide to build up North Vietnam’s industrial base. Conclusion Friction over Chinese workers’ misconduct, sloppy performace and “big brother” mentality emerged to sour Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1954-1955. More importantly, the disastrous consequences of Vietnam’s Maoism-inspired land reform modelled after China’s in 1953-1956, coupled with Hanoi’s doubt about the efficacy of China’s economic and technical aid, intensified Hanoi’s desire for economic and technical aid from the Soviet bloc to meet the North Vietnamese government’s dire needs for economic reform and development in its three-year plan, 1958-1960. In 1957, Beijing made a concerted effort to dissuade Hanoi from following the Soviet model of heavy industry. However, the necessity of drawing greater economic aid from both China and the Soviet bloc to support the three-year plan in1958-1960 dictated that Hanoi’s leaders attempted to restore solidarity in the socialist bloc. At minimum, Hanoi had to steer clear of having to openly side with China against the Soviet Union.

About the authors

Kosal Path

City University of New York

Email: kosalpath@brooklyn.cuny.edu
Ph.D., Associate Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College

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