Key milestones in Vietnam’s strategic development thinking: from “Doi Moi” (1986) to the 14th Congress of the CPV (2026)

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Introduction

Over more than four decades since the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) launched Doi Moi at the 6th National Congress (1986), Vietnam’s strategic thinking on national development has undergone systematic and continuous transformation. The decision to pursue Đổi Mới was not merely a set of economic measures but a foundational shift in the policy paradigm — the ensemble of assumptions, objectives, and policy instruments accepted and institutionalized by the state — aimed at overcoming the socio-economic crisis and rebuilding productive forces. Since then, successive Party Congresses, national strategic documents, and policy practices have created a sequence of intellectual milestones that have decisively shaped Vietnam’s long-term development trajectory.

Explaining this process requires a multidimensional approach: analyzing official documents to trace changes in dominant ideas, while cross-checking them against socio-economic evidence and scholarly analyses from both domestic and international sources to evaluate practical outcomes. In the theoretical framework of policy change, Hall’s concept of a “paradigm/policy paradigm” provides a useful analytical tool: when the paradigm shifts, governing logics and national priorities are defined, prompting successive adjustments in policy instruments and institutions [Hall 1993: 275]. Applied to Vietnam, this framework examines the interaction between an endogenous shock (the late-1980s economic crisis) and external pressures (the collapse of the Soviet bloc; global economic integration), along with the Party’s central leadership role in guiding the transformation.

The objectives of this article are threefold: (1) to identify the key milestones that shaped Vietnam’s strategic thinking from 1986 to 2026; (2) to analyze how these milestones altered policy goals, instruments, and priority ordering; and (3) to evaluate the aggregate impact on governance capacity, international integration capability, and the country’s long-term development orientation. The study addresses the following research questions: Which events constituted genuine “turning points” in strategic thinking? How did each milestone transform policy objectives and instruments? What structural policy bottlenecks remain that the 2026–2045 orientation must address?

Methodologically, the paper combines historical-policy analysis with a content analysis of key documents—Party resolutions, national strategies, and policy texts, a synthesis of secondary academic literature, and international reports (WB, OECD) to triangulate interpretations. This approach makes it possible both to a reconstruction of the sequence of intellectual changes and a connection of theory to empirical evidence — thereby deriving structural patterns and systematic policy lessons for the 2026–2045 period.

Findings indicate that Vietnam’s development thinking exhibits both continuity and innovation. From the 6th to the 14th National Congress, the country’s overarching development strategy has centred on Đổi Mới, building and refining a socialist-oriented market economy, international integration, and prioritizing science and technology. Over four decades, Vietnam has moved from a low-income state with limited infrastructure to a middle-income economy with a rising international standing. At the same time, its legal and institutional frameworks have progressively matured, while the investment environment has improved. The 14th Congress has further introduced new strategic emphases on strategic autonomy, sustainable development, digital transformation, and high-quality human capital.

Literature review

Research on the evolution of Vietnam’s development thinking since Doi Moi (1986) has produced a diverse body of scholarship that combines historical-political analysis, institutional studies, innovation studies, and regional comparative perspectives. Studies in political and economic history emphasize that the decision to pursue Đổi Mới was driven by the socio-economic crisis of the late 1970s–1980s and by a sharp decline in international assistance, which created an urgent need to restructure the economy and to redefine the country’s policy paradigm [Đào Xuân Sâm 2007; Nguyễn Ngọc Hà, Nguyễn Tất Trường 2025; Nhị Lê 2021]. The outcomes of this transformation have been widely documented. Vietnam has achieved a significant decline in household poverty and has progressively reoriented its foreign policy and development strategy toward deeper international integration, marked by milestones such as ASEAN (1995), WTO (2007), CPTPP, and EVFTA [Multi-dimensional Review… 2020: 25].

At the institutional level, domestic and international studies have examined the role of the developmental state and institutional capacity as necessary conditions for sustainable growth. Canonical studies (Evans), governance-measurement reports (Kaufmann et al.), and OECD policy analyses collectively assert that rule of law, transparency, and public-sector reform are decisive factors for sustaining growth momentum [Evans 1995; Kaufmann et al. 2009; Multi-dimensional Review… 2020]. At the same time, a number of Vietnamese scholars stress that reform must be comprehensive and coherent, and that political stability is a precondition for undertaking deep structural reforms [Đặng Quang Định 2021; Lê Thị Thanh Hà 2016].

Another cluster of studies on innovation and digital transformation argues that a growth model based on low-cost labor and natural-resource extraction is inherently limited, making a transition toward a knowledge-, technology-, and productivity-driven model increasingly necessary [Rodrik 2011; Vietnam 2035… 2016; Innovation Policy Review… 2019]. International reports further highlight the urgent need to strengthen R&D capacity, improve education, and expand digital infrastructure to avoid the middle-income trap.

Within this scholarly landscape, Russian scholarships contribute a distinct historical-strategic perspective by analyzing leadership ideas alongside the process of policy institutionalization. The monograph edited by Mazyrin and colleagues examines how the Communist Party of Vietnam adapted and creatively applied Marx–Leninist theory to the model of a “socialist-oriented market economy,” emphasising the Party’s central role in translating doctrinal thinking into implementable policy [Mazyrin 2022: 2; 10]. Tsvetov and Kolotov likewise argue that the Party leadership’s adaptive capacity was reflected in key strategic decisions, including the launch of Đổi Mới and Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN and the WTO, demonstrating the Party’s ability to navigate crises and shifting international conditions [Tsvetov 2025; Kolotov 2025]. The RIAC report further indicates that international integration has not only expanded markets but also reshaped the cognitive framework of development, shifting policy emphasis toward technology and innovation [Russia and Vietnam… 2026]. Mazyrin and Vassoevych additionally highlight political stability under the Party’s leadership as a factor enabling controlled reform and sustaining the long-term trajectory of the Renovation process [Mazyrin 2022: 10; Vassoevych 2025].

The literature review suggests that Vietnam possesses clear advantages in political stability and integration capacity. However, the country still faces significant challenges in productivity growth, value creation, and innovation capability. Two important research gaps, therefore, remain: a lack of systematic longitudinal analyses of shifts in strategic thinking and a scarcity of scholarly assessments of the 14th Party Congress documents owing to their novelty. This paper seeks to address these gaps by approaching strategic thinking as a changing “policy paradigm” that evolves through historical milestones. It also draws on insights from Russian scholarship’s valuable arguments to illuminate the Party’s leadership role in the transformation process.

Theoretical framework

This study employs the “policy-paradigm” framework to explain transformations in national-level strategic thinking. Following Hall, a policy paradigm is the constellation of assumptions, objectives, and instruments that guide decision-making within a particular period; when such a paradigm changes, governing logics and policy priorities change accordingly, leading to successive adjustments in institutional and policy instruments [Hall 1993: 275]. This framework is further complemented by Kuhn’s notion of “paradigm shift”: shocks or crises can trigger transitions from an old cognitive framework to a new one through processes of experimentation, learning, and institutionalization [Kuhn 1962].

Complementing these perspectives, theories of the developmental state and institutional capacity (Evans) help explain the Party–state’s central role in designing and implementing industrial and technological policy instruments, coordinating resources, and maintaining social stability during the transition [Evans 1995]. The theoretical toolkit is further expanded with practice-oriented concepts such as “strategic autonomy” in the context of deepening international integration, “risk governance” to cope with global shocks, and “multi-level integration,” which captures interactions among national, regional, and global governance arenas.

This combination of concepts allows the paper to analyse each milestone along three analytical dimensions: (i) shifts in strategic objectives; (ii) adjustments in policy instruments; and (iii) the social outcomes of those policy adjustments. From this analytic triad, the paper identifies broader patterns and leadership/management lessons that inform the 2026–2045 vision.

Analysis of Key Milestones

1986: Comprehensive Renovation (Đổi Mới)

Before 1986, Vietnam was experiencing a prolonged socio-economic crisis. The economy was underdeveloped, while the centralized, subsidy-based administrative mechanism revealed serious structural shortcomings. Production stagnated, and living standards were severely strained. Organizational and managerial weaknesses further limited the economy’s capacity for adaption and reform. Against this backdrop, the 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (December 1986) adopted a comprehensive program of Renovation (Doi Moi) aimed at overcoming the crisis and generating new momentum for national development. This event is widely regarded as a decisive turning point in the Party’s development thinking.

Substantively, the 6th Congress marked the shift from a centralized, subsidy-based economy toward a socialist-oriented market economy under state management. The new policy line recognised the objective existence of a multi-sectoral economy, encouraged private-sector development and expanded external economic cooperation [Văn Kiện … Lần Thứ VI 1987: 47]. At the same time, the principles of governance were defined by the formula “Party leadership, people’s mastery, and state management” [Ibid: 109]. Practical policy measures, most notably the household contracting (khoán) in agriculture, helped stimulate production and increase farmers’ autonomy.

The 6th Congress’s policy choices laid the foundation for subsequent economic growth and social improvement. During the 1990s, Vietnam’s average GDP growth reached approximately 7.6% per year [Vietnam Economic Monitor 2001]. The poverty rate fell sharply—from about 58% in the early 1990s to roughly 10% by 2010 [Vietnam: Achieving Success… 2013]—while GDP per capita rose substantially, reflecting notable gains in living standards and the economy’s productive capacity.

1991: Institutionalizing Renovation

The year 1991 marked a critical transition from the initial phase of economic recovery to a stage of deliberate institutionalization and purposeful external integration. Domestically, although the economy had begun to recover during 1986–1990, it still faced inflation, structural imbalances and institutional shortfalls; externally, the shock of the Soviet bloc’s collapse reduced traditional aid flows, forcing Vietnam to seek new sources of resources through deeper integration [Văn Kiện … Lần Thứ VII 1991: 68; Vietnam Economic Monitor 2001: 8–11].

The core content of the 1991 turning point was articulated at the 7th Congress through a Strategy of Stabilization and Development to 2000: (i) formally combining stabilization with rapid and equitable development; (ii) completing the legal and institutional framework and shifting progressively from centralized planning toward a state-managed market economy; (iii) increasing autonomy for enterprises, reforming state-owned enterprises and the banking system; and (iv) treating international integration as a strategic instrument for mobilizing capital, technology and market access [Văn Kiện … Lần Thứ VII 1991: 183–186; 64–66].

The outcome was a more transparent policy environment accompanied by strong real GDP growth (1991–1995 averaging ~8.2% p.a.), which created fiscal space for poverty reduction and rising household incomes [Niên giám thống kê 1996: 166–167]. On the foreign policy front, the “multilateralization and diversification” strategy laid the groundwork for new relationships and for accession to ASEAN (1995), opening the door to subsequent deeper integration [Vietnam Economic Monitor: 11–15].

2007: WTO Accession and Deepened Integration

By the mid-2000s, Vietnam’s strategic thinking had entered a phase of comprehensive global integration. The 10th Party Congress (2006) identified “actively and proactively integrating into the international economy; maintaining socio-political stability; and early removal of the country from the category of underdevelopment” as strategic orientations for the new development period [Văn Kiện … Lần Thứ X 2006: 75]. The signing of the WTO accession protocol (7 November 2006) and Vietnam’s formal WTO membership on 11 January 2007 marked the beginning of a “new era of comprehensive integration.”

Strategic thinking shifted from a primary focus on domestic stability to deeper engagement with global markets and binding international commitments, evident in the institutionalization of multilateral commitments: laws and institutional reforms were adopted to meet integration standards. The 2005 Law on Enterprises (effective 2006) was an important institutional step that enabled the establishment and operation of firms in all sectors, fully recognized the role of the private economy, accelerated equitization of underperforming state-owned enterprises, and opened the door to foreign investment [Luật Doanh Nghiệp… 2005]. This process was reinforced by the WTO accession schedule: as the WTO Center – VCCI analysis shows, Vietnam allowed foreign suppliers access to most sub-sectors of distribution services, including commission agents, wholesale, retail, and franchising [Cam Kết Về Dịch Vụ… 2014: 19]. The scheduled opening permitted foreign participation in retail via joint ventures and, after transition periods, wholly foreign-owned distribution enterprises, subject to economic needs tests (ENT) for additional retail outlets [Ibid: 19–20].

The strategy of this period combined liberalization with restructuring: the role of the state gradually shifted from direct administrative management toward the role of institutional architect, carrying out equitization of many underperforming state-owned enterprises and concentrating resources on priority sectors. WTO accession (2007) provided a powerful stimulus for trade and FDI [Report of the Working Party… 2007]. As a result, export turnover increased dramatically from approximately USD 48.5 billion (2007) to about USD 470–475 billion (2025)— nearly a tenfold rise in less than two decades [Viet Nam Solidifies… 2024; Vassoevych 2025; ]. In sum, deepening market mechanisms together with a state-led institutional role and commitments to multilateral integration reflected a clear advance in strategic thinking, laying the basis for an export-oriented growth model, FDI attraction, and deeper participation in global value chains.

2011: Consolidating the Ideational Foundation

The 2010s marked a critical transition after more than twenty years of Renovation. The 2006–2010 period saw both significant economic achievements and challenges (the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, inflation, systemic banking risks), which required strategic recalibration to achieve industrialization and modernization and to strengthen regional competitiveness. Politically and ideationally, the 11th National Congress (January 2011) was pivotal: it reviewed 25 years of Renovation, supplemented and developed the Platform, and established the Socio-Economic Development Strategy 2011–2020 as the medium-to-long-term development orientation for Vietnam [Cương Lĩnh Xây Dựng… 2011: 12; 91].

In policy terms, the official documents in 2011 focused on consolidating the ideational foundations while refining strategic development orientations. The 2011 amended and developed Platform reaffirmed the Party’s commitment to “Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought” as the theoretical foundation and guide for action, stipulating that all reform must be consistent with socialist orientation [Ibid: 7]. The 11th Congress’s strategic thinking sought to balance external opening with ideological orientation, treating political-ideological stability as a precondition for undertaking deep reforms [Ibid: 12–15]. The documents proposed to “apply and develop” Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought into policy directions, providing a theoretical basis for breakthrough reforms; at the same time, foreign policy was elevated to “synchronously and comprehensively deploy external activities; proactively and actively integrate internationally” [Ibid: 46].

Economically, the 11th Congress prioritized improving the quality of growth, restructuring public investment, promoting the development of a knowledge-based economy, promoting innovation, and completing the institutional framework of a socialist-oriented market economy to raise productivity and reduce dependence on low-cost labour [Cương Lĩnh Xây Dựng… 2011: 91]. These orientations were subsequently operationalised in policies and implementing instruments, with Resolution 22-NQ/TW (2013) on international integration as an important follow-up [Ibid: 46; Bộ Chính Trị 2013].

Implementation outcomes indicate that the emphasis on ideological stability reinforced the Party’s leadership during the transition, while enabling Vietnam to fulfill WTO commitments, advance negotiations on next-generation FTAs, and upgrade economic diplomacy to attract FDI into export-oriented manufacturing. Nevertheless, structural challenges related to productivity growth, value creation, and innovation capacity persisted, underscoring the need for rigorous implementation of the educational, S&T, and institutional reforms set out by the 11th Congress (GDP growth data for 2011 = 5.8–5.9%).

2020: Crisis Governance and Strategic Adaptation in the Context of a Global Pandemic

The year 2020 represented a major global shock when the COVID-19 pandemic struck, posing a dual challenge for Vietnam: protecting public health while sustaining economic activity amid disrupted supply chains and a near-collapse of tourism [Vietnam: 2020 Article… 2021: 1; Vietnam Science… 2021: 11]. Vietnam’s response rested on two pillars: (1) an assertive public-health strategy, and (2) economic-fiscal measures to mitigate socio-economic losses.

On the health front, the state established a National Steering Committee, issued a series of directives, closed borders, implemented mandatory quarantine, and deployed large-scale testing and contact tracing based on the “detect — isolate — monitor” model (the so-called “four-ring” approach), together with mask mandates and targeted lockdowns when necessary. These early measures are widely judged to have been decisive in delaying and limiting community outbreaks in 2020 [Tran et al. 2021: 2–5; Quach et al. 2021: 1].

On the socio-economic side, the policy package included monetary easing to preserve liquidity, tax deferrals and reductions, interest-rate cuts, direct support for firms and workers, and temporary social assistance; foreign-economic policy priorities focused on maintaining exports and stabilizing supply chains. The World Bank notes that these measures partially limited short-term damage but delayed delivering support to vulnerable groups, indicating a need to improve distribution mechanisms [Vietnam Science… 2021: 71–89].

The pandemic also accelerated a strategic shift toward science, technology and, innovation: Decision No. 749/QĐ-TTg (2020) approving the National Digital Transformation Program (to 2025 with a vision to 2030) established concrete objectives for the digital economy, productivity and technological capacity, while underscoring the role of the “state as institutional architect” — designing flexible legal frameworks and encouraging controlled experimentation to spur innovation and the growth of digital industries.

In terms of outcomes: on health, the early response kept case counts and fatalities low for much of 2020, an assessment corroborated by domestic studies and international reports [Tran et al. 2021: 16; Quach et al. 2021: 1]. Economically, Vietnam achieved positive growth of about 2.9% in 2020 — one of the strongest performances in the region— even as sectors such as tourism, hospitality, and certain services sustained severe losses. The World Bank warns of the risk of “prolonged vulnerability” for disadvantaged groups in the absence of effective job-recovery and productive-rebuilding policies [Vietnam: 2020 Article… 2021: 1; Vietnam Science… 2021: 26–27].

From a strategic perspective, the pandemic highlighted the centrality of state governance capacity, resilient public-health systems, supply-chain security, and digital infrastructure — elements that have become pillars of post-crisis development thinking.

2026: Strategic Orientation at the 14th Party Congress (Vision toward 2045)

The political report to the 14th Party Congress (2026) assesses a volatile global environment characterized by the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions, economic instability, and geopolitical tensions. In this context, the report stresses the need to elevate strategic development thinking to meet new challenges and seize emerging opportunities.

The 14th Congress documents develop strategic thinking around three core breakthroughs and a set of renewed principles. According to the report of the 13th Central Committee, the three strategic breakthroughs for the new term are: institutional reform and effective enforcement; a high-quality human resource base; and synchronized, modern infrastructure [Văn Kiện … Lần Thứ XIV 2026, T.1: 37–38].

These breakthroughs are described as mutually reinforcing: institutions lay the pathways, human capital determines the quality of growth, and infrastructure provides the material foundation and momentum for the economy. Successful implementation of the three breakthroughs is framed as the “decisive lever” for rapid and sustainable development in the new phase.

Looking further ahead, the documents prioritize strategic autonomy, strengthening domestic capabilities and enhancing national standing amid intensifying geostrategic competition — a discourse that expresses the 14th Congress’s emphasis on self-reliance and resilience [Ibid: 7]. At the same time, sustainable and inclusive development are strongly highlighted: the documents put people at the centre, affirm social security, and stress equity in benefit distribution [Ibid: 33].

Thus, from the Đổi Mới turning point in 1986 to the 14th Congress in 2026, Vietnam’s strategic thinking has evolved continuously: from initial recognition of market mechanisms and multi forms of ownership, through deepening international integration and institutional consolidation, to the reaffirmation of ideological foundations combined with technological innovation, and now a concentrated focus on three strategic breakthroughs under a broader vision of sustainability and strategic autonomy. These shifts reflect a flexible policy line that theoretical frameworks are continuously supplemented and adjusted promptly to help the country overcome difficulties and adapt to new development demands.

Conclusion

The analysis of the 1986–2026 trajectory shows that Vietnam’s strategic development thinking has passed through at least six interrelated turning points: (1) Đổi Mới (1986) — transition from bureaucratic, subsidy-based mechanisms toward recognition of a socialist-oriented market economy; (2) Institutionalization of Renovation (1991); (3) Deep interrnational integration (2007) — WTO accession and legal harmonization to compete globally; (4) Consolidation of the ideational foundation (2011) — securing ideological orientation while opening up; (5) Innovation and digital transformation (2020) — placing technology, data and R&D at the core of growth (Decision 749/QĐ-TTg); and (6) The 14th Congress (2026) — elevating strategic thinking with a vision of strategic autonomy, sustainable development and three breakthroughs in institutions, human capital and infrastructure. Each milestone builds on rather than severs the past, while adding new instruments to address contemporary challenges. Aggregating these milestones reveals a coherent logic: historical milestone → conceptual shift → instrument or policy adjustment → policy outcome. This logic generates successive turning points in Vietnam’s continuous strategic adaptation, underpinning the country’s achievements in each historical period.

About the authors

Thi Thanh Dung Nguyen

Author for correspondence.
Email: dungnguyenthanhhcma@gmail.com
ORCID iD: 0009-0005-1609-0607

Dr.Sc., Institute of Politics and International Relations

References

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